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The Internet has become an essential tool for various life-related
purposes, and it is an instrument necessary for the proper enjoyment of
a series of rights-including the right to access knowledge and
information and the right to communicate. This new paradigm also
implies that all people should have access to the Internet at affordable
conditions, and any restrictions should be strictly limited and
proportionate. As a consequence, any regulatory and policy measures
that affect the Internet and the content that flows over it should be
consistent with basic rights and liberties of human beings. This Article
intends to explore the challenges and opportunities for freedom of
speech and human rights on the Internet. In particular, it examines
how Internet content governance is posing provocative and fascinating
regulatory issues directly related to the growing possibilities offered by
computer-mediated communication. This debate is not simply
"technical," but also political, legal, and social since it involves
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sustainable and value-oriented solutions, but also-more
importantly-the awareness of the human-rights dimension of Internet
governance. The possible answers to these issues are at the center of
the ongoing discussion concerning the regulation of digital content and
communication technologies. Finally, drawing upon comparative and
case-study material, this Article analyses the functional relationship
between modern communication technologies, legislative reforms in the
area of digital communications, and constitutional freedoms.
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INTRODUCTION
Extensive information and communication-technology
infrastructure and widespread flows of information have become
fundamental and distinctive features of our lives. This increasingly
pervasive, variegated, and constantly changing interaction between
communication technologies and society brings with it a broad range
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of legal and ethical dilemmas, especially those pertaining to protection
and promotion of the freedom of expression. Electronic
communication tools hold the potential to positively or negatively
affect the rights of the individual. The Internet has become an
essential instrument and can now be viewed as a condition necessary
for the proper enjoyment of a series of rights, including the rights to
access information and to communicate. As a consequence, any
regulatory and policy measures that affect the digital-information
infrastructure and its content should be consistent with the basic
rights and liberties of human beings. This Article will investigate the
challenges and opportunities for freedom of speech and human rights
on the Internet. In particular, it examines how Internet content
governance is posing provocative and fascinating regulatory issues
directly related to the growing possibilities offered by
computer-mediated communication. This debate is not simply
"technical," but also political, legal, and social since it involves
sustainable, value-oriented solutions, and, perhaps more importantly,
the awareness of the human-rights dimension of Internet governance.
Emphasis will rest on how developments in Internet regulation and
Internet technologies can pose risks for human rights, particularly in
relation to freedoms of expression, association, information,
communication, and privacy.
In the field of new media, citizens face a conflict between the
democratic function performed by digital communications and the
commercial enclosures driven by its services. Networked society is
witnessing a shift of communication power away from the traditional
information chain.' Today, the devices and applications used to
obtain, exchange, and disseminate information are mainly horizontal
tools based on interactive processes. 2 The role and power of this
contemporary form of communication are increasing, opening up new
individual and collective methods of expressions and a range of new
potential rights. This also significantly impacts the balance of power
and interests between key institutional players. 3 Manuel Castells
argues that power "is no longer concentrated in institutions (the
state), organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic controllers
(corporate media, churches). It is diffused in global networks of
wealth, power, information and images which circulate and transmute
1. See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY (2001).
2. See id. at 2.
3. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE:
THE POWER OF IDENTITY 359 (2d ed. 2010).
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in [a] system of variable geometry and dematerialized geography." 4 In
this multifaceted framework, this Article explores the relationship
between modern communication technologies and constitutional
freedoms. In particular, it takes a closer look at the relationships
between modern communication technologies, legislative reforms in
the area of digital communications, and fundamental rights. This
Article also gives attention to the necessity of rebalancing the current
culture of rights characterized by exclusionary and divisive attitudes,
which are mainly oriented towards control.5  Networked digital
communications are today rightly considered crucial components of a
democratic system because they move "information, knowledge, and
culture," which are key elements to "human freedom and human
development."
6
Moving from this premise, this Article investigates the rapid
technological and "informational developments" 7 and their legal
implications for the societies in which they operate. The core
argument reviews some case-study material and discusses how access
to network services is increasingly perceived as being worthy of
elevation to the status of a right. This Article tries to clarify if
technology could be considered an enabler of rights or a right itself.
This particular context also helps determine whether new phenomena
that take place in the world of communication technology can change
the structure of rights by establishing new claims or rights or by
introducing a new perspective from which to view them.
Part I of this Article considers how the advent and
development of the Internet has eroded the role of traditional media
as the most appropriate place for freedom of speech and expression.
Part I also discusses the social and democratic potential of information
and communication technologies and their capacities to create forms
of participatory democracy and positively affect individual rights and
freedoms. Part II takes a closer look at the main determinants of
contrast between the recently introduced content reforms and
4. Id. at 424.
5. See NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION vii (2002); Fiona Macmillan, Commodification and Cultural Ownership, in
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 35, 53 (Jonathan
Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005).
6. See YOACHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1 (2006).
7. Referring to "the growing significance of information products ... and information
services . . . to the increasing volumes of information available, to the role of information
technologies as part of society's infrastructure and to the contribution of information handling
activities to key economic transactions ...." Cees J. Hamelink, Communication Rights and the
European Information Society, in THE EUROPEAN INFORMATION SOCIETY: A REALITY CHECK 121,
121 (Jan Servaes ed., 2003).
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computer-mediated communication. Part II also clarifies the
boundaries of communication rights in today's information society.
Part III illustrates the current heated debate surrounding government
regulation of illegal digital content, highlighting relationships between
modern communication technologies, protection of intellectual
property rights, and fundamental freedoms. In particular, Part III
discusses how recently introduced digital-content reforms are
increasingly perceived as a serious threat to fundamental rights and
liberties. Part IV argues that, even in light of recent court decisions,
universal access to the network infrastructure is an essential element
for strengthening democracy and a broad range of fundamental rights.
Finally, Part V analyzes the transnational controversy over the
supposed right to Internet access, clarifying whether technology
should be considered an enabler of rights or a right itself. Part V
concludes by proposing a responsible and fair approach to balance this
delicate issue.
I. THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Technological developments in communication have brought
revolutionary opportunities and changes to how people obtain,
process, and exchange information. In this framework, one of the
contemporary and emerging challenges for the legal and regulatory
regime is shaping a modern interpretation of freedom of thought and
expression.8 The rapidly evolving media revolution has generated a
number of new regulatory initiatives designed to reduce systemic risks
associated with this means of communication "ranging from risks to
children, to privacy, to intellectual property rights, to national
security, which might more indirectly, and often unintentionally,
enhance or curtail freedom of expression."9
As Yochai Benkler so eloquently expressed in The Wealth of
Networks,
[a] series of changes in the technologies, economic organization, and social practices of
production in this environment has created new opportunities for how we make and
exchange information, knowledge, and culture .... This new freedom holds great
practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as a platform for better
democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and self-reflective
8. See WILLIAM H. DUTTON ET AL., FREEDOM OF CONNECTION, FREEDOM OF
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culture; and, in an increasingly information-dependent global economy, as a mechanism
to achieve improvements in human development everywhere.
10
The relevance of networked communication as a tool of mass
democracy has proven increasingly evident.11 In some countries, the
Internet serves as the only source of pluralistic and independent
information. 12 In this respect, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has correctly observed that "[ilt is the mass media that make
the exercise of freedom of expression a reality. ' 13 Information and
communication technologies have therefore rapidly appeared as key
instruments for the human-rights movement. 14 The recent events of
the Arab Spring have served to highlight how important new
communication and information technologies have become. 15  The
surprising outcomes of these social movements are partially attributed
to the greater availability of Internet access and to the power of
social-media technology. 16 Using a mix of blogs and social networking
sites, the new medium has demonstrated its power to support
spontaneous democratic mobilization from below-a concrete and
participatory form of democracy. 17  These protests were direct
consequences of the rapidly deteriorating living conditions and
enhanced perceptions of intolerable levels of corruption and absence of
10. See BENKLER, supra note 6, at 2.
11. See TOBY MENDEL & EVE SALOMON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BROADCASTING
REGULATION 11 (2011); Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Beyond Denial: Introducing Next-
Generation Information Access Controls, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER,
RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 3, 3-4 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE INTERNET 7-10 (Steven Hick, Edward F. Halpin & Eric Hoskins eds., 2000)
(arguing that the Internet has proven to be an effective instrument for the promotion and
protection of human rights by disseminating and communicating information).
12. See MENDEL & SALOMON, supra note 11, at 11.
13. See Compulsory Membership in Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism (American Convention on Human Rights arts. 13 & 29), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, 34 (Nov. 13, 1985).
14. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNET, supra note 11, at 8.
15. See Philip N. Howard & Muzammil M. Hussain, The Role of Digital Media, J.
DEMOCRACY, July 2011, at 35, 35-36 (arguing that digital social media were the main reason
behind the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings); see also Eben Moglen, Why Political Liberty
Depends on Software Freedom More Than Ever, Speech at the 2011 FOSDEM Conference in
Brussels (Feb. 5, 2011), available at http://www.softwarefreedom.org/events/2011/fosdemmoglen-
fosdem-keynote.html.
16. If it is true that so-called Arab springs were characterized by the use of social
networks, it seems equally true that many of the promoters of these protests have previously
participated in training courses sponsored by nonprofit organizations such as the National
Endowment for Democracy or the Open Society Foundation. See Luca Mainoldi, I Padroni di
Internet, 1 LIMES "MEDIA COME ARMI" 10 (2012).
17. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 427, 438 (2009). See also Howard & Hussain, supra note 15, at 36.
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democracy in these countries.18 Popular demonstrations started in
Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman,
Yemen, Algeria, and Libya.1 9 They were driven by well-educated
"digital natives"-young people who have grown up with web
technology. 2° Most of these physical protests were organized through
virtual communication channels, merging together virtual and
physical spaces. 21  The result of these online movements was
surprising, with hundreds of thousands of people being summoned to
action. Most unexpectedly, these new forms of political and social
expression occurred simultaneously in many parts of the world. Up
until now, only great political and union organizations possessed this
level of influence. Events have shown that digital communication
tools can yield enormous impacts on public opinion and
decision-making.
Social networks like Twitter and Facebook have played key
roles in characterizing the dynamics of these pro-democracy protests.
The Arab Spring was planned, organized, and executed through viral
demonstrations launched via digital and electronic media. 22 The use
and availability of digital and social media is one of the most
significant and effective elements for explaining both the vulnerability
of these autocratic regimes and the success of social movements. 23
Twitter was one of the key methods of communication used by
activists "to draw the international community into Egyptian
events."24 The capture of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was immediately
widespread on YouTube; the locations of protests by the Spanish
"indignados" were available on Twitter; and Facebook effectively
18. See Gabriel Ben-Dor, Democratization Processes in the Middle East and the Arab
World, in THE ARAB SPRING, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS 12, 14 (Efraim Inbar ed., 2013); Kenneth Roth, Time to Abandon the Autocrats
and Embrace Rights: The International Response to the Arab Spring, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/time-abandon-autocrats-and-embrace-rights
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014).
19. See id.
20. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 1-2 (2008) (illustrating inter-generational differences in the
use of digital technologies).
21. See Wael Salah Fahmi, Bloggers' Street Movement and the Right to the City:
(Re)claiming Cairo's Real and Virtual "Spaces of Freedom", 21 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 89, 89
(2009); see also Lorenzo Mosca, From the Streets to the Net? The Political Use of the Internet by
Social Movements, 1 INT'L J. E-POL. 1, 1 (2010).
22. See PHILIP N. HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M. HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY'S FOURTH WAVE?:
DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING 27 (2013); Ben-Dor, supra note 18, at 14.
23. See generally HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 55.
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captured the riots and violence in Syria. 25 The ubiquitous "Arab
satellite channels also broadcast nearly nonstop coverage" of
antigovernment demonstrations, helping to undermine the legitimacy
of these repressive and authoritarian regimes. 26 Notably, people have
used these global interconnected networks and platforms to challenge
the sovereignty and legitimacy of their governments. 27 However, an
obvious and significant difference exists between using the Internet to
protest against a nasty regime and using it to build up a robust and
functional democracy. As observed by several commentators, the
current state of affairs in the Maghreb region is far more complicated
than before (despite the successful uprising), and a new challenge has
emerged in the area.
28
These new forms of political and social activism are
intrinsically linked to the growing power of technology and are
common in Western liberal democracies as well as developing
countries. 29 The US "Occupy Wall Street" and the trans-European
"Indignados" protesters provide empirical evidence of the mobilizing
and political potential of the Internet. 30  Both movements offer
tangible examples of the features and potential provided by new
horizontal communication channels.31 In this view, the Internet has
25. See LYOMBE EKO, NEW MEDIA, OLD REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNICATION LAW AND POLICY 129-31 (2012); JEAN-PIERRE FILIU, THE ARAB REVOLUTION:
TEN LESSONS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC UPRISING 55 (2011); Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, et al., Los
Twindignados: The Rise of the Indignados Movement on Twitter, SOCIALCOM-PASSAT 496, 496
(2012); Peter Beaumont, The Truth About Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab
World, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2011), www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-
uprisings-arab-libya; Kareem Fahim et al., Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/1O/21/world/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-
libyan-forces-take-surt.html?pagewanted-all&_r=2&.
26. See Jeffrey Ghannam, In the Middle East, This Is Not a Facebook Revolution, WASH.
POST (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/freedom-beyond-140-
characters/2011102/18/ABoLRiH story_1.html.
27. See HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 22, at 37.
28. See BEN WAGNER, AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: NEW PATHS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE INTERNET IN EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 8-12 (2012); Toby Dodge, From the "Arab
Awakening' to the Arab Spring; The Post-Colonial State in the Middle East, in AFTER THE ARAB
SPRING: POWER SHIFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5, 6-7 (2012).
29. See, e.g., Ernesto Castafieda, The Indignados of Spain: A Precedent to Occupy Wall
Street, 11 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 309 (2012) (analyzing the Indignados movement in Barcelona,
Spain); Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, The Fight for "Real Democracy" at the Heart of Occupy
Wall Street, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com
/print/98542?page=show; Jeffrey S. Juris, Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media,
Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation, 39 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 259-79 (2012) (arguing
that in the trans-national Occupy movements social media have significantly contributed to
powerful logics of aggregation); Eric Turner, The Grillini in Italy: New Horizons for Internet-
based Mobilization and Participation, 12 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 214 (2012) (exploring the
Grillini and internetworked movements in Italy).
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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revivified "the notion of freedom of expression as an individual
liberty"32 no longer mediated by other elements. The Internet has
effectively returned more power to individuals with a radical
redistribution of control of information flow and a completely new
approach to how society operatesY3 It is therefore reasonable to agree
that digital networks, along with the physical occupation of urban
spaces, can reasonably provide the platform for a new form of
democratic and pluralistic political process. 34
The UN Human Rights Council has stated that this latest wave
of demonstrations has also "shown the key role that the Internet can
play in mobilizing the population to call for justice, equality,
accountability[,] and better respect for human rights. As such,
facilitating access to the Internet for all individuals, with as little
restriction to online content as possible, should be a priority for all
States."3 5 Blogs, video, and social networking sites have become key
instruments for political debate and expression of dissenting views,
provoking counter-responses not just from repressive states but also in
the so-called free world.3 6  A recent Freedom House study of
forty-seven countries attempted to measure each country's level of
Internet and digital-media freedom, examining obstacles to access,
limits on content, and violations of user rights. 37 According to the
study, despite some specific recent improvements in selected
countries, restrictions on Internet freedom and access to information
continue to grow.38 In particular, the study shows how Internet
content restrictions are partly connected to the increasing success of
social media and networking sites often used for political and social
32. See VINCENZO ZENO-ZENCOVICH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 100 (Sir Basil Maxkesinis & Dr. J6rg Fedtke, eds., 2008).
33. See ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW xiii (1999) (observing how new
technology is allowing individuals to take power from large institutions such as government,
corporations and the media); see also MANUEL CASTELLS, NETWORKS OF OUTRAGE AND HOPE:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERNET AGE 105 (2012) (observing how social movements were not
mediated by formal political organization).
34. See id. at 106.
35. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by
Frank La Rue), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/
A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf [hereinafter UN Human Rights Council 2011].
36. See Douwe Korff & Ian Brown, Social Media and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND A CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE 175, 176 (2011).
37. See SANJA KELLY & SARAH COOK, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012: A GLOBAL
ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA 2 (Sanja Kelly, Sarah Cook & Mai Truong eds.,
2012), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN%202012%20FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter FREEDOM ON THE NET].
38. See id. at 2.
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activism. 39 More positively, the Internet remains a relatively free
domain for expression when compared to the more repressive or
hostile treatment of traditional media in an important contingent of
the countries covered.
40
All of these observations suggest that web-based social
networks allow for the free flow of information between equals in an
autonomous social space; a place in which individuals can critically
debate different kinds of issues, with possible migration from the
virtual environments to the physical. In addition, these new avenues
of communication can also serve to activate and strengthen other
fundamental rights. 41 The dynamics of these information-diffusion
models seem likely to reify Habermas's famous theory of the "public
sphere."42  In fact, the central aspect of Habermas' public-sphere
model was based on its disjunction from the powers of the state and
the market.43  This public-sphere model operates through an
expectation of accessibility that allows all citizens to participate
without restraint and requires public debate to be open in both
content and format. 44 According to Habermas, a fully operable public
sphere is fundamental to the functioning of democratic societies.
45
The elements of the access to the public sphere include physical and
social access.46 The relevant aspect is that even in a networked
society, access remains a key democratic element. Citizens can now
stand in front of an "online public sphere" based on the same elements
and principles transposed from the physical world to the network.
47
39. See id. at 3.
40. See id. at 12.
41. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35.
42. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27 (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence
trans., 1989) (1962). According to Habermas, the public sphere "may be conceived above all as
the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere
regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over
the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of
commodity exchange and social labor." Id.
43. See Jiurgen Habermas, The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article, 3 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 49 (Sara Lennox & Frank Lennox trans., 1964) (defining the public sphere as the
"realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed").
44. See id.
45. See id. at 54 n.5.
46. See STEPHEN CARR ET AL., PUBLIC SPACE 138, 150 (1992).
47. For a modern application of Habermas's theory, see Mark Poster, Cyberdemocracy:
The Internet and the Public Sphere, in READING DIGITAL CULTURE 259, 265 (David Trend ed.,
2001) (noting that "[t]he age of the public sphere as face-to-face talk is clearly over: the question
of democracy must henceforth take into account new forms of electronically mediated
discourse."). See generally THE NETWORK SOCIETY: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO POLICY (Manuel
Castells & Gustavo Cardoso eds., 2005).
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A. The Tricky Task of Balancing Rights with Regulation
As some authors have reported, Internet filtering, content
regulation, and online surveillance are increasing in scale, scope, and
sophistication around the world-in both democratic countries and
authoritarian states.4 The most troublesome aspect of this current
trend is that "the new tools for Internet controls that are emerging go
beyond mere denial of information."49 The world faces a strategic shift
away from direct interdictions of digital content and towards indirect
control of Internet communications through a form of cooperation
between governments and Internet service providers (ISPs).50
Different countries have proposed law enforcement policies like the
"graduated response" or "three strikes" policies. 5' These policies put
in place systems for terminating Internet connections for repeat online
infringements. 52 The existing and expanding legal regime for the
protection of intellectual property rights seriously hampers an
individual's ability to access information and communicate. 53
The practical effect of these increasing methods of control is
that the freedom of the networked environment is increasingly
squeezed by security needs, market-based logic, and government
intervention.54  As in the past, innovations in communication
technology have upset the previous balance of power. 55 But now, the
situation has probably gone beyond the normal interactions between
opposing players. With respect to security needs, it should be
necessary to satisfy an effective democratic control to ensure that
restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals are
kept at a minimum. Each country should identify proper avenues of
control in conformity with their democratic principles.
48. See Deibert & Rohozinski, supra note 11, at xv.
49. Id. at 6.
50. See 21 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 12 (2009); Laurent Szuskin et al., Client
Alert: Beyond Counterfeiting: The Expanding Battle Against Online Piracy; Recent Developments
in France - Update, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (June 18, 2009), available at http://www.lw.com/
uploadlpubContent/_pdflpub2687_l.pdf.
51. See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 695, 727 (2011) (mentioning the U.K., France, South Korea, and Taiwan).
52. See Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers - Is
the "Graduated Response"a Good Reply?, 1 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 75, 80 (2009).
53. See Cees J. Hamelink, Human Rights for the Information Society, in
COMMUNICATING IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 121, 154 (Bruce Girard & SeAn 6 Siochrd eds.,
2003).
54. See STEFANO RODOTA, LA VITA E LE REGOLE: TRA DIRITTO E NON DIRITrO 135 (2006).
55. See Carolyn Marvin & Mark Winther, Computer-Ease: A Twentieth-Century Literacy
Emergent, in LINGUISTICS AND LITERACY 209, 231 (William Frawley ed., 1982) (arguing that
innovations in communications technology have always been advertised as far surpassing the
capacities of previously existing technologies for transmitting and storing information).
2014] 819
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
Unfortunately, market forces are inclined to shape the network
as an increasingly close-meshed tool within which democratic
citizenship is gradually reduced. Furthermore, within this setting,
some significant threats to rights and freedoms posed by growing
government intervention occur. 56 This new environment has opened
an animated discussion about a possible "institutional translation" of
the meanings, values, and scope attached to communications sent over
the network.5 In particular, this debate focuses on issues of equal,
public, and fair access to media and digital information platforms.
58
In light of this debate, this Article focuses on the vexing and
controversial question of "Internet access" as a basic human right.
59
Essentially this discussion revolves around whether the Internet-or
more precisely the access to it-should be correctly reognized (or not)
as a human right because of its special role in society. The core of this
issue is not only whether a new human right needs to be developed for
the Information Society but also how to move beyond simplistic
journalistic interpretations that reduce facts to sensationalism and
literal legal interpretation.
B. The Different Levels of Internet Access
The concept of access to the Internet may be described in
several ways: (1) access to network infrastructure, (2) access at the
transport layer and services, and (3) access to digital content and
applications. However, these concepts are limited since access to the
transport and content layers require access the network
infrastructure. 60 As recently observed by Frank La Rue, the Special
Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, we can
56. See FREEDOM ON THE NET, supra note 37, at 2-3.
57. See generally CHERYL ANN BISHOP, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2012) (discussing how conceptualizing access to government information
as a human right is new development in global trend promoting institutional transparency);
DUTTON ET AL., supra note 8; HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY (Rikke
Frank Jergensen ed., 2006); RECLAIMING THE MEDIA: COMMUNICATION RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC
MEDIA ROLEs (Bart Cammaerts & Nico Carpentier eds., 2007); UN Human Rights Council 2011,
supra note 35; DUNJA MIJATOV16, OSCE REPORT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON THE INTERNET
(2010), available at http://www.osce.org/fom/80723.
58. For a pioneering analysis, see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969) (arguing a positive
right to communicate over radio, television and newspapers).
59. See Michael L. Best, Can the Internet Be a Human Right?, 4 HUM. RTS. & HUM.
WELFARE 23 (2004).
60. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 563 (2000)
(describing all layers of the information environment); see also JONATHAN ZI'FRAIN, THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW TO STOP IT 67 (2008).
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simply consider two dimensions of "Internet access": access to the
network infrastructure (connectivity) and access to online content.
61
Both aspects pose distinct but interrelated fundamental rights
challenges. Content relates to the availability of information for
Internet users. Restricting access to content seriously impairs the
freedom of users. On the other hand, connectivity relates to the
infrastructure necessary to access the content, such as cable, software,
and devices. The availability of this infrastructure essentially deals
with provision of telecommunications services.
II. INTERNET REGULATION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The Internet serves as the most widely utilized digital
communication tool employed to propagate information. Through its
network, individuals have new opportunities to share knowledge and
ideas, express their creativity, and participate in social, cultural,
economic, and political life.62 The Internet is also perceived as a
fundamental instrument to guarantee effective freedom of
expression, 63 and it provides a technological enrichment of individual
freedom of expression. 64 For this reason, digital rights defenders and
digital libertarians "have raised growing concerns over how legal and
regulatory trends might be constraining freedom of expression" over
the Internet. 65 The Internet has the potential to strengthen freedom
of expression by providing new mechanisms for exchanging data and,
as a consequence, ensuring a more intense flow of information.6 6 At
the same time, these conditions supply justifications for content
regulation targeted in part at counteracting the pervasiveness and
anarchic nature of the medium.
67
The Internet and new media can more strongly impact
democratization than traditional media.68  Digital networked
61. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35.
62. See Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, One Nation, Online, BOS. GLOBE (June 20, 2010),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/06/20/onenation-online.
63. See ZENO-ZENCOVICH, supra note 32, at 99.
64. See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Good for Liberty, Bad for Security? Global
Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY
OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 123, 141 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008).
65. See DUTTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
66. See ZENO-ZENCOVICH, supra note 32, at 101.
67. See generally MICHAEL HOLOUBEK ET AL., REGULATING CONTENT - EUROPEAN
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE MEDIA AND RELATED CREATIVE SECTORS (2007); ZENO-
ZENCOVICH, supra note 32, at 107.
68. See Marc Raboy, Media and Democratization in the Information Society, in
COMMUNICATING IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 101, 114 (Bruce Girard & SeAn 6 Siochrd eds.,
2003) ("In the current context of globalization, the media can be either a locomotive of human
development or an instrument of power and domination.").
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communications have completely changed how people interact with
the flow of information and knowledge. 69 The Internet has also
transformed democratic institutions at large. It has opened new
approaches of communication and expanded access to different sources
of information. 70 It has disrupted traditional modes of social and
political communication and scholarly publishing and knowledge
dissemination, as well as long-standing business models. 71 It is also
changing interactions and organizational dynamics between states
and citizens.72 For these reasons, there is a growing trend among civil
liberties groups, human-rights activists, and legal scholars to argue
that "Internet access has become so essential to participation in
society... that it should be seen as a right, a basic prerogative of all
citizens." 73  A full range of human activities are now intimately
connected to online services: finding and applying for a job, doing
research, completing education, taking part in social communication,
participating in politics, finding legislative information, enjoying
entertainment, and participating in commerce.7 4 It is therefore clear
that access to the Internet is becoming a fundamental instrument for
active, democratic participation in public life and broader society. At
the same time, society faces conflict between the democratic function
performed by digital communications and the commercial restrictions
driven by its services.
Citizens' perception of the value of the Internet access is very
strong.75 The prominence of this type of indicator suggests the need
69. See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (discussing
implications and opportunities of digital technology); JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE NETWORK
SOCIETY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF NEW MEDIA 1-2 (Leontine Spoorenberg trans., 1999).
70. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
71. See Roger Clarke, Freedom of Information? The Internet as Harbinger of the New
Dark Ages, 4 FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/699/609.
72. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (2006); ANDREW CHADWICK, INTERNET
POLITICS: STATES, CITIZENS, AND NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (2006); STEPHEN
COLEMAN & JAY G. BLUMLER, THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THEORY, PRACTICE
AND POLICY (2009); DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: DISCOURSE AND DECISION MAKING IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (Barry N. Hague & Brian D. Loader eds., 1999); Viktor Mayer-Schbvnberger
& David Lazer, From Electronic Government to Information Government, in GOVERNANCE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: FROM ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION GOVERNMENT 1
(Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & David Lazer eds., 2007 ).
73. See Tuhus-Dubrow, supra note 62; see also Alisdair A. Gillespie, Restricting Access
to the Internet by Sex Offenders, 19 INT'L. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 165 (2011) (discussing whether
access to the Internet is a human right).
74. See Tuhus-Dubrow, supra note 62.
75. A recent international survey sponsored by the British Broadcast Company (BBC)
and released in 2010 has shown the feeling that people have with this legal issue. See Four in
Five Regard Internet Access as a Fundamental Right: Global Poll, BBC WORLD SERVICE (Aug. 3,
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for systematic and rigorous analysis of the social and legal
implications of Internet governance and content regulation.
In performing this analysis, two main aspects deserve
particular consideration: (1) the relevance and role of
computer-mediated communication and its potential impact on the
democratization of freedom of expression and the problem of
conflicting rights, and (2) the debated question of the regulation of
digital content and Internet-based applications in general. For
example, the US Supreme Court identified a First Amendment
approach toward computer-mediated communication in two leading
cases: Reno v. ACLU 76 and Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.7v Additionally, insight
may be garnered from the French Constitutional Council decision No.
2009-580DC,78 as well as other recent legislative attempts to regulate
and monitor digital information. In light of these regulatory
interactions, it is necessary to discuss and examine the possibility of
introducing a human rights-based impact assessment on Internet
technology and governance "in order to make sure that we can
maximize the positive effects" of digital media and minimize the
negative ones.
79
A. Digital Content Reforms Recently Introduced or Discussed in
Europe and the United States
In almost all democratic systems, use of both new and old
forms of information media have not only posed problems of boundary
definition, but have often resulted in attempts to contain and control
information flow.8 0 Computer-mediated communication goes beyond
the control of the nation-state, "ushering in a new era of
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/sharedfbsp/hi/pdfs/08 03 10 BBCinternet poll.pdf. According to
this 2010 poll across 26 nations, nearly 80 percent of respondents in 26 countries believe access
to the World Wide Web should be considered a basic human right. See id.
76. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
77. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
78. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.) (regarding Act furthering the diffusion and protection of creation on
the Internet), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel
/rootfbank mmlanglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English). The law reviewed by the French
Constitutional Council is the so called "HADOPI 1": Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la
diffusion et la protection de la crbation sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 furthering
the diffusion and protection of creation on the Internet], 135 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RItPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [JO.] [OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p. 9666.
79. See Wolfgang Kleinwchter, Editorial, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 7, 8 (Wolfgang Kleinwachter ed., 2012) (observing how such a human-rights
assessment can be most effective if it is done in a multi-stakeholder environment).
80. See CASTELLS, supra note 3, at 320.
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extra-territorial communication."81  The problem of information
control is thus amplified by the phenomenon of new media.8 2 In
particular, policy discussions regarding better regulation of the
Internet started to gain ground as soon as the rapid growth of digital
transmission techniques made protection of intellectual property
rights became a pressing issue.8 3 Commercial interests act as the
prime agents behind the huge development of content over the
Internet.8 4  Consequently, when intellectual property rights are
implicated, those commercial entities respond with requests for more
control for online behavior.8 5 Traditionally, the relationship between
intellectual property rights and fundamental rights was mainly seen
in terms of mutual balance and harmony. But as a result of a new
enforcement agenda, parties are witnessing exponential growth in the
number of controversies that lie at the intersection of these two
domains.
86
In order to contain information and preserve control over
access, several countries have adopted legislative measures to
regulate and monitor digital content. For example, specific state
legislation has been implemented in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.8 7 In particular,
regulations designed to monitor and control the flow of information on
the Internet increased following September 11, 2001.88 Under the
mantle of national security and the "War on Terror," a general decline
81. See id. at 319.
82. See DOMINIQUE FORAY, THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (2004).
83. See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000) (reporting the complex challenge to
established norms created by the radical growth in information technology).
84. See Jamal B. Shahin, The Internet: A Case Study for Global Governance, 5 SwISS
POL. Sci. REV. 120, 121 (2011).
85. See id. at 123.
86. See Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?, 5 MINN. J. L., SCI. & TECH. 47 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation
Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(2008). See generally LAURENCE HELFER & GRAEME AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011).
87. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998);
Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.); Copyright (Infringing File Sharing)
Amendment Act 2011 (N.Z.); Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.). Furthermore, in the U.S., a
private Memorandum of Understanding was also signed between copyright industries and major
ISPs. See Memorandum of Understanding between Content Owner Representatives and ISPs
(July 6, 2011), available at http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-contentluploadsl2013/
02fMemorandum-of-Understanding.pdf.
88. See Ronald J. Deibert, Black Code Redux: Censorship, Surveillance, and the
Militarization of Cyberspace, in DIGITAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: TACTICS IN HARD TIMES 137,
137 (Megan Boler ed., 2008).
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of fundamental rights has occurred.8 9 Virtually every industrialized
country and many developing countries have passed laws that expand
"the capacities of state intelligence and law enforcement agencies to
monitor Internet communications. '" 90 Online media faces a massive
increase in regulation at the transnational and national levels. 91
Important digital content reforms have been recently introduced or
discussed in Europe and the United States.92  These legislative
instruments have pursued two broad approaches in order to regulate
traffic on the Internet: imposing obligations on Internet
intermediaries and imposing restrictions on Internet users. 93 They
have also created a social climate and legal environment that hamper
information use and restrict access to information sources.
Already introduced and enacted legislation, like the "Sinde
law" in Spain, 94 and the Haute Autorit6 pour la diffusion des ceuvres et
la protection des droits sur internet (HADOPI) law in France,95 directly
threaten the Internet as a free, egalitarian, and democratic way of
communicating. The same issues arise with proposed legislation like
the international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 96 the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA),97 and the Protect Intellectual Property
Act (PIPA)98 discussed in the United States. The legislation is often
aimed to fight online piracy and copyright infringement, as well as
newer forms of cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. But Internet
activists and freedom-of-expression defenders fear that similar legal
89. See Hamelink, supra note 53, at 154.
90. See Deibert, supra note 88, at 137-38.
91. See Deibert, supra note 88 at 138.
92. See, e.g., the French Hadopi Law; the Spanish "Sinde law"; Digital Economy Act,
2010, c. 24 (U.K.); Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, May 2011, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/iproperty/pdfs/actall05_en.pdf; Online Protection and
Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012); Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R.
3261, 112th Cong. (2012); Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2012).
93. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, SHIELDING THE MESSENGERS:
PROTECTING INTERNET PLATFORMS FOR EXPRESSION AND INNOVATION (2012), available at
https://www.cdt.org/files/file/Intermediary-Liability-6p.pdf; Joel R. Reidemberg, States and
Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213, 222 (2003) (addressing the concerns and
motivation of different types of enforcement of decisions through Internet instruments).
94. Ley 2/2011 de 4 de marzo de Economia Sostenible (B.O.E. 2011, 55) (Spain).
95. Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la crdation
sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 furthering the diffusion and protection of creation
on the Internet], 135 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p. 9666.
96. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, May 2011, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/economy/iproperty/pdfs/acta 1105-en.pdf.
97. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2012).
98. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2012).
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instruments can also be used to establish a surveillance regime that
allows restrictions on freedom of movement over different types of
communication technologies.9 9 Such ongoing attempts to regulate the
Internet "reflect a natural maturation process that previous media,
such as print, radio, and television, all experienced as they evolved out
of unrestrained and experimental to tightly controlled and regulated
environments."100
The experience of democratic countries with provisions
designed to monitor and control the flow of information on the
Internet reveals that restrictions on the freedom of the media may not
withstand constitutional scrutiny101 The degree to which the different
constitutional protections in each nation can interact in this area
varies across medium and nature of content. In particular,
constitutional scrutiny of media access regulation has traditionally
varied significantly by the predefined category of technology (print,
radio and television), but constitutional debates surrounding modern
digital platforms continue to be perceived in traditional terms.
10 2
Media freedom is usually guaranteed or limited by media laws, but
the advent of the Internet has highlighted how traditional regulation
and control policy can go beyond the regulatory mechanisms used for
traditional media.10 3 The global dimension of the Internet requires a
shift from conventional media regulation. The promotion of freedom,
access to information, and pluralism of the media (including
unrestricted media regulation) are all key aspects for supporting a
concrete implementation of freedom of expression, which represents
one of the basic elements of all democratic societies.
Internet regulations often draw criticism for their inability to
reconcile technological progress with protection of economic interests
and other conflicting interests. Essentially, these policy measures
"alter the environment within which Internet communications take
place." 10 4  Illustrative examples include: the controversy over the
99. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 93.
100. See Deibert, supra note 88, at 137.
101. See, for example, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (overturning the
Communications Decency Act which attempted to limit minors' access to Internet pornography),
or the more recent case of the French Hadopi law enacted to fight Internet piracy, partly
censored by the Conseil Constitutionnel. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court]
decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.) (regarding Act furthering the diffusion
and protection of creation on the Internet), available at http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnellrootlbank mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
102. See John Blevins, Meet the New Scarcity: A First Amendment Framework for
Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79 TENN. L. REV. 353, 366 (2012).
103. See CENTER FOR MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM, EUROPEAN UNION
COMPETENCIES IN RESPECT OF MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 14-15, 27 (2013).
104. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 134; Deibert & Rohozinski, supra note 11, at 152.
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constitutionality of the US Communication Decency Act of 1996 in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, invalidating certain
provisions of a proposed law designed to regulate indecent and
obscene speech on the Internet;I05 the US Supreme Court ruling in
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, holding that the
enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act should be enjoined
because the law likely violated the First Amendment;106 and the
French case of the "Loi Fillon," in which the French Constitutional
Council censored most of the dispositions of the Fillon amendment
concerning regulation of the Internet and the linked power given to
the Conseil Supgrieur de l'Audiovisuel.10 7  Another interesting
example is the most recent decision regarding the HADOPI law, 108
which was partially censored by the French Constitutional Council on
the grounds of its inconsistency with Article 11 of the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789
Declaration). 109
Two classic questions naturally arise from these judicial
decisions: (1) what restrictions and safeguards should be imposed on
the fundamental freedom of expression in a democratic society, and (2)
under which conditions and guarantees are these restrictions and
safeguards feasible? Discussing the Internet's communications
potential requires an evaluation of the preconditions that facilitate or
inhibit the effective use of information resources. One of these
preconditions is the right of access to communication resources or, as
already defined, the right to communicate.110
105. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
106. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2002).
107. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 96-378DC, July
23, 1996, Rec. 99 (Fr.), JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [JO.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 27, 1996, p. 11400 (Fr.) (censoring most of the dispositions of the
Fillon amendment concerning regulation of the Internet and the linked power given to the
Conseil Supgrieur de l'Audiovisuel [Audiovisual Regulatory Authority]).
108. Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la cr6ation
sur internet, 135 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p. 9666.
109. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.) (regarding Act furthering the diffusion and protection of creation on
the Internet), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel
/rootlbankmm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
110. See generally THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE: A NEW HUMAN RIGHT (Desmond Fisher
& L.S. Harms eds., 1983); C.G. Weeramantry, Access to Information: A New Human Right, 4
AsiAN Y.B. INT'L L. 99 (1994).
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B. The Boundaries and Dimensions of Communication Rights in the
Digital Environment
Attempts to regulate amid the incredible growth of the
information and communication platforms need to be based on a set of
foundational principles important for any democratic institution.
International human-rights standards can represent such principles
and should be used as a guiding framework for future government
policies and actions.111 This Article aims to offer some basic insights
on the concept, evolution, and legal framework of communication and
information rights.
For the purposes of this Article, the concepts of fundamental
rights and human rights are interchangeable. Generally speaking,
fundamental or human rights are those universal rights which are
indispensable elements of a democratic society to the life and dignity
of the individual and need to be protected and respected as founding
principles of a state's behavior towards people living within its
borders. 1 2 They are usually entrenched in bills of rights, treaties, or
constitutions and assisted or safeguarded by specialized
institutions. 1 3  The concept of fundamental rights is inherently
heterogeneous and multifaceted. The definitions and levels of
coverage of the human-rights umbrella are open to interpretation and
may vary according to the context. 114  Furthermore, moral
considerations can play a role in the quantification and qualification of
breaches of fundamental rights.
Even with a working definition of human rights in place, an
overview of the fundamental rights framework relevant to the debate
over the boundaries and features of communication rights in the
111. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY CAUCUS, TOWARDS AN
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SOCIETY RESPECTFUL OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, AS
WELL AS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (2003).
112. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, sec. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (noting that "these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person" and that "Each State Party undertakes to respect and ensure [the rights recognized in
the agreement] to all individuals within its territory"); REBECCA M. M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 195 (2d ed. 1992) (observing that human rights "are regarded as those fundamental and
inalienable rights which are essential for life as a human being."). For a more extended
discussion on human rights, see also generally MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?
(1973).
113. See LORENZO ZUCCA, CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: CONFLICTS OF FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE AND THE USA 3 (2007).
114. See Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 257, 262 (1984) ("To say that
there is widespread acceptance of the principle of human rights on the domestic and
international planes is not to say that there is complete agreement about the nature of such
rights or their substantive scope - which is to say, their definition.").
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digital environment is necessary.1 15 It must examine the question of
whether new human-rights standards need to be developed for the
information and communication society. 116 In this framework, one of
the most-discussed aspects concerns the interactions between current
"informational developments" and the human-rights provisions
relevant to this new dimension. Fundamental rights that are relevant
to current "informational developments" can be related to freedom of
expression, protection of privacy, security of information
infrastructures, and protection of intellectual property rights.
1 17
The bidirectional interactions between digital-communication
technologies and society can have legal, political, economic, and
ethical dimensions "for which the international community has
established human rights standards."118 The lack of implementation
poses a major problem.1 9 This situation has arisen precisely because
"[n]o effective mechanisms have been established to deal with all the
obstacles that hamper the realization of human rights in the field of
informational developments. Moreover, current human-rights
provisions focus exclusively on 'information' and ignore
'communication.' 1 20  At the time it emerged, the right of access to
communication resources was considered a fundamental human right
and, as such, an indispensable precondition for other human rights
"because communication is intimately bound up with what it means to
be human."' 21 In recent literature on whether access to the Internet
can be regarded as a fundamental right, it has been stressed that
"recognising access to the [I]nternet could be considered the
re-ignition of previous attempts to recognise a general right to
communication."1 22 Communication is a fundamental social process
that enables information to be exchanged, founding the pillar and core
of any democratic system. 23 The freedom to express opinions and
receive and communicate information without interference or pressure
by public authorities is an essential element of democracy. A concrete
pluralism of information media, a broad access to information sources,
115. See Hamelink, supra note 53, at 121 (underlining how current human-rights
provisions focus exclusively on information aspects and ignoring communication).
116. The question has been thoroughly discussed in literature. See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN,
CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 323 (rev. ed. 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 57; Hamelink, supra note 53.
117. See Hamelink, supra note 7.
118. See Hamelink, supra note 53, at 121.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See Michael Traber, Communication as a Human Need and Human Right, 39
RELIGION & SOC'Y 1, 9 (1992).
122. See Gillespie, supra note 73, at 167.
123. See Hamelink, supra note 53, at 157.
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and the full inclusion of all individuals in the informational processes
achieves these objectives. 124 As soon as such a scenario is set up, it
remains necessary to settle a right to communication not simply
related to content, but with a wider focus, "including providing an
obligation on the State to facilitate communication between society
and protect communication from arbitrary restrictions or control."'
125
The development of modern communication technologies has
inflamed this discussion again. In particular, in the context of the
Information Society, the right of access to all the means of
expression-i.e., the right to communicate-is progressively coming
into conflict with governments' desires to enforce security and monitor
user behaviors. 
126
Even if communication rights have not been properly codified
and do not have a clearly outlined legal status, legal scholars hold the
view that all of the rights' essential elements have been settled in
international treaties or conventions. 127 Communication rights are
also defined as "those rights-codified in international and regional
human-rights instruments-that pertain to standards of performance
with regard to the provision of information and the functioning of
communication processes in society."'128 "Communication rights" is
therefore a useful term that relates directly to a set of preexisting
human rights. 129 The core of communication rights emanates directly
from the specific provision of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 30 and it has since developed in the context of
subsequent features of the information environment.' 3' Furthermore,
the fundamental value of communication has been detailed in formal
terms in numerous national and international statutes. 32 When
124. See Cees J. Hamelink & Julia Hoffmann, The State of The Right to Communicate, 7
GLOBAL MEDIA J. (2008), available at http://lass.purduecal.edu/cca/gmj/faO8/gmj-faO8-hamelink-
hoffman.htm.
125. See Gillespie, supra note 73, at 167.
126. See SEAN 0 SIOCHRJ ET AL., ASSESSING COMMUNICATION RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 13
(2005).
127. See Hamelink & Hoffmann, supra note 124; Hannu Nieminen, Towards the
Democratic Regulation of European Media and Communication, in MEDIA FREEDOM AND
PLURALISM: MEDIA POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE ENLARGED EUROPE 3, 15 (Beata Klimkiewicz ed.,
2010); Weeramantry, supra note 110, at 104. See generally THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE: A NEW
HUMAN RIGHT, supra note 110.
128. See Cees J. Hamelink & Kaarle Nordestreng, Towards Democratic Media
Governance, in MEDIA BETWEEN CULTURE AND COMMERCE 225, 234 (Els de Bens ed., 2007).
129. See SIOCHRU ET AL., supra note 126, at 20.
130. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
131. See Hamelink & Nordestreng, supra note 128, at 234.
132. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., arts. I-X; D6claration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de
1789 [Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen or Declaration of Human and Civic
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referring to the exercise of the rights to communication or the freedom
of expression, it is common to refer to the internationally recognized
laws and standards for human rights set out in these official
documents. 133 This recognized body of international law represents
the means whereby individuals may realize their inherent dignity and
personal autonomy. Ratification of an international human-rights
treaty obliges a state to implement those rights in its domestic law
and to guarantee that domestic legal remedies are available for any
asserted breaches. 134  The problems come when society, culture,
technology, and science change rapidly, making it difficult to keep up
with new developments. This condition implies that the
understanding of what human rights guarantee should change as
well. In other words, information and communication rights relating
to freedom of expression-embodied in the aforementioned
international treaties-need to be reassessed under the new
conditions of global interactive communication tools. 13 5
In addition, freedom of expression is a right with a high level of
specificity. It can actually be considered a meta-right because of its
true potential to "[enable] enjoyment of so many other rights," such as
political participation, cultural rights, and rights to assembly and
association. 136 In this context, the Internet can be conceived as an
instrument that ensures the individual's ability to actively participate
in democracy and civil and political life, without discrimination or
limitation.
From the above considerations, it is evident that the right to
communicate is a multifaceted concept that can encompass a wide
Rights] art. 11, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution
/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de- 1789 [hereinafter D6claration des Droits
de l'Homme 1789]; The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. XI, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1; Declaration of Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass
Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human
Rights, and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Doc. 20C/20 Rev. (Nov. 21, 1978);
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. X, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
133. See, e.g., infra note 138 and accompanying text.
134. See generally Lawrence Preuss, The Execution of Treaty Obligations Through
Internal Law - System of the United States and of Some Other Countries, 45 AM. SOC. INT. L.
PROC. 82, 91 (1951).
135. See Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J.
393, 407 (2013) (observing how the protection of individuals with regard to new media also
requires an evolutive interpretation of human-rights treaties).
136. See Michael O'Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No
34, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 631 (2012) (observing how this nexus is not only limited to civil
and political rights but could be extended easily to other rights).
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variety of rights and liberties and is subject to patterns of evolution
like any kind of information media. 137  In fact, the right to
communicate not only includes rights to information and expression; it
also incorporates the right to inform and be informed, the right to
actively participate in the communication process using different kind
of media, the right of impartial access to information resources, and
the right of cultural and individual privacy of communication.1 38 In
this respect, the current framework of information rights does not
explicitly take into consideration the fact that modern communication
technologies are essentially based on interactive processes. 1 39 For this
reason, the right to communicate partly diverges from the traditional
concepts of freedom of information. 140 The right to communicate
emphasizes the process of communication rather than just the
content. 141 Accordingly, communication rights relating to freedom of
expression should be reconsidered in the context of global
interactive-communication technologies. This goal could be realized
through the expansion or reinterpretation of existing rights, or
through the recognition of a new specific right.142
Access to digital content and access to the physical networked
infrastructure both seem to be covered by the existing legal
umbrella.1 43 In other words, a focus on recognizing new rights would
be misplaced because international law already safeguards all the
137. In its 2005 book, the campaign on Communication Rights in the Information Society
(CRIS), grouped the family of rights that comprise communication rights within four pillars:
Communicating in the Public Sphere; Communication Knowledge; Civil Rights in
Communication; and Cultural Rights in Communication. See SIOCHRU ET AL., supra note 126, at
40-44.
138. See Jim Richstad & Michael H. Anderson, Policy Context for News and a 'New
Order', in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 9, 26-27 (Jim Richstad &
Michael H. Anderson eds., 1981); see also William Mclver et al., The Internet and the Right to
Communicate, 8 FIRST MONDAY (2003), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/
index.php/fmIarticle/view/1102/1%20022.
139. See SIOCHRIJ ET AL., supra note 126, at 23; Hamelink, supra note 53, at 121
(observing how "[n]o human rights standard has been adopted to address communication as an
interactive process").
140. See William F. Birdsall, Web 2.0 as a Social Movement, 4 WEBOLOGY (2007),
available at www.webology.ir/2007/v4n2/a40.html.
141. Id.
142. See SIOCHRIJ ET AL., supra note 126, at 20; see also Land, supra note 135, at 396.
143. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, at 1 (The report argues that the
special and transformative nature of the Internet can not only facilitate individuals to exercise
their right to freedom of opinion and expression, but also function as an activating element for
the enjoyment of other human rights.); see also Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 61, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011) (affirming that States already have a positive obligation to promote and
facilitate "the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and the means necessary to
exercise this right, which includes the Internet").
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means necessary to exercise the right to freedom of expression, and
such means include the Internet.
144
III. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER INTERNET ACCESS AND REGULATION
OF ILLEGAL DIGITAL CONTENT
The multimedia revolution has affected not only habits of
thought and expression, but also the ways people participate in
society. Networked communication can in fact have many potential
intersections with the world that surrounds us. Around these themes,
a global debate has risen centering on issues concerning fundamental
freedoms and access to knowledge. 145 The rules governing the world of
information and communication have never been the subject of such
profound changes as they are in the current period. This has caused
tension in the delicate balance that underpins fundamental rights and
basic democratic principles. Regulatory policies should not unduly
interfere with or restrict freedom of expression, which is
constitutionally protected in many liberal and democratic countries.
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights lists freedom of
expression as one if its cornerstones and the European Convention on
Human Rights recognizes it as a fundamental right. 146  The
justification for protecting the freedom of expression is to enable the
self-expression of the speakers. 147 However, freedom of expression is
not an absolute right, and consequently some limitations and
restrictions may apply under legitimate circumstances. 148 Expression
may be legitimately restricted under international human-rights law
to safeguard the rights of others. 149 Frank La Rue states that any
limitation to the right to freedom of expression must conform to
legality, legitimacy, and proportionality requirements.1 50  This
three-step test functions as a balancing assessment to determine
144. See Land, supra note 135, at 5.
145. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 883 (2008).
146. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
147. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 18 (1999).
148. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, 24; MICHEL VERPEAUX,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 42-46 (2010); ZENO-ZENCOVICH, supra note 32, at 80. See generally
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
149. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 72-87, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010) (providing a complete list of elements to be satisfied for
restriction to the freedom of expression under the exception of Article 19(3) of the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)).
150. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, 24.
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whether the potentially harmful effects on freedom of expression are
outweighed by the beneficial effects of the proposed measure.
15 1
It is also necessary to distinguish between the right to freedom
of expression and the right of access to the medium. 152 The natures of
the two rights are different, and their two profiles do not necessarily
match.153 The right to freedom of expression is not the right to have
the material availability of every possible means of dissemination of
thought. 154 On the contrary, this right requires the legal ability to use
and access all means of expression available in light of the principle of
equality and with the conditions or limits required by the particular
characteristics of each means of communication. 155 Ensuring access to
digital networks is indeed one of the essential and fundamental
elements of human rights and democratic principles that must be
guaranteed.
In almost all democratic societies, new media, besides
incurring definitional problems, has led to attempts to control online
information.1 56 The advent of the Internet has had a profound impact
on the general framework of media regulation and on the governance
of the broadcasting sector in general.1 57 This has often led to the
adoption of legislative measures criticized for failing to balance
technological progress with economic and other interests.
In recent years, several states have attempted to regulate
content on the Internet. One of the most famous, and certainly one of
the most debated, was the US Communication Decency Act of 1996
(CDA). It was the first important effort by the US Congress to control
pornographic content on the Internet.1 58 This statute is also relevant
because it led to the US Supreme Court's first decision directly
confronting Internet regulation policies.
In the landmark 1997 case of Reno v. ACLU, the US Supreme
Court held that the CDA violated the freedom of speech provision of
the First Amendment. In an effort to protect minors from "indecent"
and "patently offensive" materials, the CDA had the effect, among
other things, of restricting access to material that was not harmful to
151. See id.
152. See generally Blevins, supra note 102, at 371-72.
153. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 27-28; Emerson, supra note 148, at 879-81; see also
Blevins, supra note 102.
154. See generally SADURSKI, supra note 147; VERPEAUX, supra note 148.
155. See VERPEAUX, supra note 148, at 42-46.
156. See SUNSTEIN supra note 68, at 138.
157. See MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
REVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE 216 (2002); LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 20 (2009).
158. See Julie Hersberger, Internet censorship, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA 264,
266 (Hossein Bignoli ed., 2004).
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adults. 159  The case generated considerable international press
coverage, as well as heated legal debate over freedom of expression on
the Internet and in developing technologies. 160 Many of the findings
and conclusions reached by the Court in 1997 are still relevant today.
Among the essential findings, the Court set out the nature of
cyberspace, the techniques of accessing and communicating over
digital networks, and some alternative means of restricting access to
the Internet.16' For example, the Court realized that the Internet
"constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a
world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers."162 In this way, "any person or organization with a computer
connected to the Internet can 'publish' information. '" 163 But most
significantly, for the first time, the Supreme Court introduced a sort of
legal recognition to have unrestricted access to the Internet through a
broad interpretation of the First Amendment. 164 In other words, the
Court extended free speech rights to the Internet. The rationale
expressed by the Supreme Court confirmed the opinion of the district
court. 165 In particular, the opinion-as written by Justice
Stevens-restated one of the district court's conclusions: "As 'the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed' . . . [the Internet] is
'entitled to the highest protection from governmental intrusion."' 166
The decision concluded by holding: "As a matter of constitutional
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." 16 7 The
Supreme Court's ruling made clear that communications over the
Internet deserve the highest level of constitutional protection.168 The
159. In particular, the court held that "in order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, provisions effectively suppressed speech that adults have a constitutional right
to receive and to address to one another, with no demonstration less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving legitimate purpose that statute was enacted to serve."
159. See 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
160. See GODWIN supra note 171.
161. See Stephen C. Jacques, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First
Amendment and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1945, 1975-76 (1997).
162. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
166. 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997).
167. Id. at 885.
168. Id.; see also American Library Association, Resolution on the Use of Filtering
Software in Libraries (July 2, 1997), available at http://www.ala.org/advocacy
intfreedom/statementspols/ifresolutions/resolutionuse (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
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Court has also acknowledged the democratizing and emancipatory
power of the Internet, in that "through the use of [Internet
communication tools], any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox." 169  Inappropriate, intrusive, or unbalanced regulatory
measures could serve to greatly increase the barrier to entry, thus
jeopardizing the foundational structure of the Internet and chilling
free speech. In other words, the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression implies a constitutional protection of the access to
information through the Internet.
The US Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in
Reno by passing a new legislation, the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA). But this second attempt to regulate Internet content did not
fully resolve the constitutional issues presented by the provision of the
CDA. 170  In fact, the new regulatory instrument "essentially
incorporated the traditional standards of obscenity law (which in
theory deny any protection to speech that is found to be 'obscene')."
1 71
After three separate rounds of litigation, the Supreme Court held the
statute invalid on the ground that the government had not shown
COPA to be the least restrictive means of regulating indecent content
on the Internet.The CDA case seems to be connected with a red thread
to the current debate over Internet access and regulation of illegal
material. Today, as in the past, the need to find the most appropriate
balance between the protection of individual rights and the general
interests of the community is a very complex issue.
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERNET ACCESS FOR THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Internet's role as a tool for freedom of expression is
inherently limited by the requirement that each voice first have access
to the medium. As such, access to the Internet should be protected as
strongly as the various forms of participation and expression that it
allows. Access to the Internet is increasingly enabling fundamental
rights such as freedom of expression, association, information, and
communication.1 72 It is precisely for this reason that in July 2012 the
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution affirming "that the same
rights that people have offline must also be protected online".1 73 This
169. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
170. See DEIBERT ET AL., supra note 8, at 229.
171. See GLEN 0. ROBINSON AND THOMAS B. NACHBAR, COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
33 (2008).
172. See Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 19.
173. See Human Rights Council Res. 20, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of
Human Rights on the Internet, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20[L.13 (June 29, 2012). 'To ensure
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approach means there is no need to initiate or advocate new human
rights. Rather, they must be applied to Internet-related cases in light
of online challenges. 74 Ensuring access to digital networks is indeed
one of the broader set of essential and fundamental elements of
human rights and democratic principles that states must protect as
society moves online.
A. Early European Experimentation: HADOPI and Beyond
Across Europe, some countries have taken clear steps towards
recognizing the right to Internet access as a distinctive right.
Following these initial actions, there is now a growing debate among
governments, policy makers, and civil societies regarding the legal
status of the access to network services.
75
Discussion began after a recent and innovative decision of the
French Conseil Constititionnel on June 22, 2009.176 For some
commentators, this decision supports the pursuit of legal recognition
of access to the Internet as a fundamental right.1 77 By reviewing the
constitutionality of laws under Article 61, paragraph 2 of the French
Constitution, 178 the Court declared partially unconstitutional the
that existing human rights and fundamental freedoms apply equally offline and online," the
Council of Europe has recently promoted the adoption of a comprehensive guide to human rights
for Internet users. See Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of
Ministers to member States on a Guide to human rights for Internet users (adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on Apr. 16, 2014, at the 1197th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies),
available at https://wcd.coe.int[ViewDoc.jsp?id-2184807&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=
C3C3C3&BackColorlntranet=EDBO2 1&BackColorLogged=F5D383.
174. See Matthias Kettemann, UN Human Rights Council Confirms that Human Rights
Apply to the Internet, EJIL: TALK! (July 23, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-human-rights-
council-confirms-that-human-rights-apply-to-the-internet/.
175. See generally UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35; Nicola Lucchi, Access
to Network Services and Protection of Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of
Internet Access for the Freedom of Expression, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 645 (2011);
DUTTON ET AL., supra note 8; MIJATOVI6, supra note 57; LISA HORNER ET AL., INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
ENLARGED BUREAU OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2010), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses-qe/201 1/010306/P7-RE(2011)010306
(ANN)_EN.pdf.
176. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.) (regarding Act furthering the diffusion and protection of creation on
the Internet), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
root/bank mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
177. See Laure Marino, Le Droit dAccs & Internet, Nouveau Droit Fondamental, 30 REC.
DALLOZ 2045 (2009).
178. See 1958 CONST. art. 61, § 2 (Fr.) (According to this provision, "Acts of Parliament
may be referred to the Constitutional Council, before their promulgation, by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the
Senate, sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators."); see also GEORGE A.
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HADOPI law,1 79 which was aimed at preventing the illegal copying
and redistribution over the Internet of digital content protected by
copyright.180
With the HADOPI antipiracy legislation, France became the
first European country to experiment with a warning system to
protect copyrighted works on the web.181  Pursuant to this law,
Internet usage is monitored to detect illegal content sharing, and
suspected infringers are tracked back to their ISPs. 182 The legislation
provides for gradual intervention. The law's three-strikes procedure
provides for three written warnings before requiring a formal judicial
complaint.183 The first step consists of an email warnings sent directly
by the ISPs at the request of the Haute Authorite pour la Diffusion des
Oeuvres et la Protection des Droits sur Internet (HADOPI
Authority). 8 4 If illegal activity is observed in the six-month period
following the first notification, the HADOPI Authority can send a
second email warning followed by a communication by registered
mail.185 Should alleged copyright infringement continue thereafter,
the suspected infringer is reported to a judge who has the power to
impose a range of penalties, such as Internet disconnection.1 86 This
particular form of sanction was declared to be inconsistent with the
BERMAN & ETIENNE PICARD (EDS.), INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 30-31 (2008); FRANCIS
HAMON & MICHEL TROPER, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 834 (31st ed. 2009).
179. See Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la
crbation sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 furthering the diffusion and protection of
creation on the Internet], 135 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RiEPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p. 9666.
180. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/rootlbank_mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
181. See DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2012: EXPANDING CHOICE. GOING GLOBAL, INT'L FED'N
OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS 17 (2012), available at www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf.
182. See Code de la propri~t6 intellectuelle [C. PROP. INTELL.] [Intellectual Property
Code] art. L331-21, § 1 (Fr.).
183. See id. art. L331-25.
184. See id.
185. See id. art. L331-25, al. 2.
186. See id. art. L335-7. On July 8, 2013, the French Culture minister issued a decree
amending the graduated response scheme to replace the disconnection penalty with a fine. See
Loi 2013-596 du 8 juillet 2013 supprimant la peine contraventionnelle compl6mentaire de
suspension de I'acc6s A un service de communication au public en ligne et relatif aux modalitds
de transmission des informations pr6vue A l'article L331-21 du code de la proprit6 intellectuelle
[Decree No. 2013-596 of 8 July 2013 abolishing the additional misdemeanor punishable by
suspension of access to a communication service to the public online and on the procedure for
transmission of information under Article L. 331-21 of the code IP], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RitPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jul. 9, 2013, p. 11428, available
at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027678782.
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provision of the 1789 Declaration.18 7 At the same time, it is still an
open question whether the HADOPI law is an effective tool to police
the Internet with respect to copyright infringement.1 8 8 However, in
July 2013, the French Government adopted a decree amending the
HADOPI law again and redesigning the penalty system.18 9  In
particular, this decree completely changes the structure of the
graduate response regime, replacing the disconnection penalty with a
fine. 190 In addition, the French minister of culture announced a
comprehensive review of the role and powers of the HADOPI authority
explaining that suspension was no longer seen as an appropriate
remedy. 191
When called to evaluate the constitutionality of the normative
act, the Conseil Constitutionnel highlighted a sort of "fundamental
right" of access to computer networks.1 92 At the same time, it laid the
basis for a debate about the need of a balancing analysis by a
jurisdictional authority before any sanctions are applied-a debate
187. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.frconseil-
constitutionnel/rootlbank-mmrlanglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
188. Statistical surveys-conducted by the same HADOPI Authority-on the impact of
HADOPI Law seem to confirm the effectiveness of the "graduated response" procedure. See
HADOPI AUTORITi9, Hadopi, 1 '1 Year After the Launch, available at http://www.hadopi.fr
/sites/defaultfiles/page/pdf/note17EN.pdf. From October 2010 to December 2011, the
graduated response procedures targeted 65,848 people. See id. Of the first-strikers, 6 percent
contacted HADOPI, while that jumped to 25 percent and 71 percent for second and third-
strikers. See id. Most of them reportedly committed to stopping illegal downloads or to securing
their network. See id. In a survey of 1,500 people aged fifteen and up, 71 percent of peer-to-peer
users said they would stop downloading illegally if caught by HADOPI. See id. The downsizing of
the package of sanctions provided by law HADOPI was further weakened with the approval of
the Decree of 8 July 2013, n. 596, which abolished the judicial measure of blocking access to the
Internet, replacing it with a fine under the responsibility of another administrative authority.
See Loi 2013-596 du 8 juillet 2013 supprimant la peine contraventionnelle complbmentaire de
suspension de l'accbs A un service de communication au public en ligne et relatif aux modalit~s
de transmission des informations pr~vue A larticle L331-21 du code de la propri6t6 intellectuelle
[Decree No. 2013-596 of 8 July 2013 abolishing the additional misdemeanor punishable by
suspension of access to a communication service to the public online and on the procedure for
transmission of information under Article L. 331-21 of the code IP], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA




191. See Minist~re de la Culture et de la Communication, Publication du ddcret
supprimant la peine complkmentaire de la suspension d'acc~s & Internet (Jul. 9, 2013), available
at http://www.culturecommunication.gouv.fr/Espace-Presse/Communiques-de-presse/Publication-
du-decret-supprimant-la-peine-complementaire-de-la-suspension-dacces-a-Internet; see also
Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating Graduated Response, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming).
192. See Marino, supra note 158; see also Commentaire de la d~cision n' 2009-580 DC -
10 juin 2009, Les Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel Cahier N0 27 1, 7, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/200958ODCccc-
580dc.pdf [hereinafter Commentaire de la d6cision n' 2009-580].
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with consequences that may extend beyond the French border. In
addition to France, similar regulations and provisions have been
implemented, considered, or rejected by Australia, Hong Kong,
Italy, 193 Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea,
Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. I94 The framework set up
by the HADOPI law has also affected the relationship between the use
of networks and fundamental rights, adversely impacting pan-
European policies as well as other European countries. For example,
in the United Kingdom, the Digital Economy Act 95 addresses the
problem of online copyright infringement by introducing the same
graduated response regime as HADOPI. An analogous system is in
use or being considered in New Zealand, Taiwan, and South Korea.196
The same concerns have arisen in regards to the secret negotiation of
the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),197 which
also focused on the implementation of a "graduated response"
regime. 98 Many European countries refused to ratify ACTA, citing
privacy and human-rights concerns. 199 The European Commission
officially submitted a request for an opinion on ACTA to the European
Court of Justice in order to examine its compatibility with its treaties
193. See Francesco Portolano & Maria Pia Peluso, Italy's Proposal on Internet
Regulation: Dawn of a New Era?, MEDIALAWS (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.medialaws.eu
/italy%E2%80%99s-proposal-on-internet-regulation-dawn-of-a-new-era.
194. See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1376-77 (2010)
("[Slimilar laws and policies have been adopted, considered, or rejected by Australia, Germany,
Hong Kong, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United
Kingdom. Thus far, proposals for the development of a graduated response system have been
rejected by Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, and Sweden as well as the European Parliament."); see
also INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011 at 18-19 (Jan. 20,
2011), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR201.pdf (reporting that France,
South Korea, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Taiwan, and Chile have implemented a graduated
response system).
195. Digital Economy Act, 59 Eliz. 2, c. 24, § 124A (2010) (U.K.).
196. See Peppe Santoro, Progressive IP Strategies for European Clients, in INSIDE THE
MINDS: IP CLIENT STRATEGIES IN EUROPE 161, 168-69 (2010).
197. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Public PredecisionallDeliberative
Draft (Apr. 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc146029.pdf.
For more detailed information on the negotiation of the proposed treaty, see generally MICHAEL
BLAKENEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) (2012).
198. Professor Alain Strowel describes "graduated response" as "an alternative
mechanism to fight []nternet piracy (in particular resulting from P2P file sharing) that relies on
a form of co-operation with the [I]nternet access providers that goes beyond the classical 'notice
and take down' approach, and implies an educational notification mechanism for alleged online
infringers before more stringent measures can be imposed (including, possibly, the suspension or
termination of the [1Internet service)." Strowel supra note 52, at 77.
199. See Acta: Germany Delays Signing Anti-Piracy Agreement, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10,
2012, 1:55 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/technology-16980451; Acta Loses More Support in




and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.200 In
the meantime, on July 4, 2012, ACTA was rejected by the European
Parliament 478 votes to 39 with 165 abstentions.201 This complete
rejection means that neither the European Union nor its individual
member states can adopt the agreement. 202
Finally, another similar example is offered by the Ley Sinde
(Sinde's law),203  which represented the first legal instrument
introduced in Spain to address the illegal downloading of copyrighted
content on the web.20 4 The provisions included in Spain's Sustainable
Economy Act establish a special commission designed to review
requests submitted by copyright holders against websites for
suspected infringement activity. 20 5 This recently appointed special
commission has the authority to shut down the website due to the
violations and also take actions against content intermediaries.2 06 The
procedure laid out in this law constitutes an explicit reversal of the
tolerance demonstrated by the Iberian case law regarding the
exchange of copyright-protected digital content made for nonprofit or
personal use.20
7
200. See Statement by John Clancy, EU Trade Spokesman (May 11, 2012), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=799.
201. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ACTA Before the European Parliament (July 4, 2012,
3:23 PM), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/
20120217BKG38488.
202. See id. Under EU Treaty articles 207 and 218, the majority of international
agreements necessitate Parliament's consent to enter into force. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 207 & 208, May 9, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 49.
Correspondingly, all EU countries need to ratify them. See id.
203. Named after former Minister of Culture, Angeles Gonzdlez-Sinde.
204. Ley 2/2011 de 4 de marzo de Economia Sostenible (B.O.E. 2011, 55) (Spain).
205. See id.
206. See Real decreto 1889/2011, do 30 de decembro, polo que se regula o funcionamento
da Comisi6n de Propiedade Intelectual (B.O.E. 2011, 315) (Spain). The royal decree also sets
down the administrative procedure-with a formal and limited judicial review-for the
sanctioning of illegal distribution of copyrighted content. See id. For further comments on this
law, see Ram6n Durdn Rivacoba, La Proteccidn de la propiedad intelectual en el dmbito de la
sociedad de la informacidn y de comercio electrdnico (A prop6sito de la "Ley Sinde"), ARANZADI
cIVIL-MERCANTIL 23 (2011); Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodriguez-Cano, La Ley Sinde, ARANZADI CIVIL-
MERCANTIL 11 (2011); Josep Carbonell & Maria Sabat~s, La Controversia Disposicidn Final
Cuadraggsima Tercera: "Ley Sinde," 19 ECONOMIST & JURIST, May 2011, at 26; Blanca Cortbs
Fernandez et al., La Ley Sinde: Funciones y Disfunciones, 62 COMUNICACIONES EN PROPIEDAD
INDUSTRIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 75 (2011); Moisbs Barrio Andrbs, Luces y Sombras
del Procedimento para el Cierre de Pagina Web: A Proposito del Desarrollo Reglamentario de la
"Ley Sinde," DIARIO LA LEY 7789 (2012); David Ord6fiez Solis, Ciberpiratas, Administracin y
Jueces: A Propdsito de la Aplicaci6n de la Ley Sinde, DiARIO LA LEY 7822 (2012).
207. See Peguera, supra note 187, at 165.
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B. Implications for a Fundamental Freedom of Communication
In this tumultuous setting, the HADOPI decision of the French
Constitutional Council triggered a debate about Internet access as a
possible constitutional or fundamental right.208 In fact, one the most
troublesome issues the Conseil Constitutionnel had to address
concerned the right of access to online networks. 20 9 The Conseil
Constitutionnel based its discussion of this issue on Article 11 of the
1789 Declaration. 210  According to Article 11, "[tlhe free
communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the
rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print
with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom
as shall be defined by law."211  The judges of the Conseil
Constitutionnel concluded that this right includes the freedom to
access online networks, given the diffusion of such services and their
growing importance to the participation in democratic life and,
consequently, to freedom of expression. 212  Specifically, the Court
observed how today the right to freedom of expression and information
has become synonymous with access to the Internet.
21 3
In other words, the Court determined the law at issue, which
contemplates forcibly disconnecting an individual from the Internet
without any type of judicial oversight, conflicted with Article 11 of the
1789 Declaration, which still enjoys constitutional value in France.
214
Although the Conseil Constitutionnel concluded that Internet access
could not be considered a fundamental right in itself, the freedom of
communication-that enjoys a particular status as a protected
right-certainly deserves strengthened protection with respect to
208. See David Banisar, The Right to Information in the Age of Information, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 85-86 (Rikke Frank Jorgensen ed., 2006).
209. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/rootlbank-mmanglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
210. D6claration des Droits de l'Homme 1789, supra note 132, art. 11.
211. See id. (translated by author).
212. See VERPEAUX, supra note 148, at 40.
213. The Supreme Court judgment states that "In the current state of the means of
communication and given the generalized development of public online communication services
and the importance of the latter for the participation in democracy and the expression of ideas
and opinions, this right implies freedom to access such services." See Conseil constitutionnel [CC]
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), 12, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank-mm/anglais/
2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
214. See BERMAN & PICARD, supra note 159, at 14-15, 419.
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Internet access. 215 This type of communication-as opposed to other
forms of access to information-necessarily relates to each
individual.
216
The Conseil Constitutionnel, in applying its jurisprudence on
the assessment of proportionality, has established that the freedom of
communication, as applied to the right of access to network services,
assumes a particular importance. 217 Consequently, the restrictions
imposed by the sanctioning power must be limited. 218 On this issue,
the Conseil Constitutionnel stated that "violations of freedom of access
to the Internet can be analyzed, under the Constitution, as invasions
of the liberty guaranteed by the Article 11 of the [1789
Declaration]." 219 Access to such an important tool of communication
has become, for millions of citizens, an integral part of their exercise of
many other constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.220
Therefore, inhibiting access to such a source of information would
constitute a disproportionate sanction, in the sense that it would also
have a strong and direct impact on the exercise of those constitutional
rights and freedoms. 221 The Internet, as opposed to other forms of
media, allows for the exercise of the freedom of communication not
only in a passive way, but also in an active way because the user can
be both a producer and consumer of information. 222 Thus, individuals
on the Internet are "active producers of information content, not just
recipients." 22
3
The impact of this specific decision relies on the understanding
that violations of freedom of access to the Internet can be analyzed
under the Constitution as violations of freedom guaranteed by Article
11 of the 1789 Declaration. 224 On the same point, the European
Parliament has recently stated that the right to Internet access also
constitutes a guarantee of the right to access education.2 25 On March
215. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-




219. See Commentaire de la d~cision n' 2009-580, supra note 173, at 7.
220. E.g., freedom of expression; the right to education and culture; right to development;
right to participate in society. See BENKLER, supra note 6, at 15.
221. See Marino, supra note 158, at 2045.
222. See ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW 104-05 (2010); HENRY H.
PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY § 2.01[B] (2d ed. 2001).
223. See Balkin, supra note 17, at 440.
224. See Commentaire de la d6cision n ° 2009-580, supra note 173, at 6-8.
225. See Recommendation of 26 March 2009 to the Council on Strengthening Security and
Fundamental Freedoms on the Internet, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, available at
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22, 2009, the European Parliament declared that granting all citizens
Internet access is equivalent to ensuring access to education, stating
that such access should therefore not be denied or used as a sanction
by governments or private companies.
226
Finally, the European Union reform concerning a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks (the
Telecoms Package) 227 has incorporated the provisions of Article 1(3)(a)
to the new Framework Directive 228 that, in the words of a European
Commission press release, leads to identifying Internet access as "part
of fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and the
freedom to access information.'" 229 Furthermore, these rules
provide that any measures taken by a national telecoms regulator regarding access to or
use of services and applications through electronic communications networks must
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, including in relation to privacy,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-
0194+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN.
226. Specifically, the EU Parliament stated that, "whereas e-illiteracy will be the new
illiteracy of the 21st Century; whereas ensuring that all citizens have access to the Internet is
therefore equivalent to ensuring that all citizens have access to schooling, and whereas such
access should not be punitively denied by governments or private companies; whereas such
access should not be abused in pursuit of illegal activities; whereas it is important to deal with
emerging issues such as network neutrality, interoperability, global reachability of all Internet
nodes, and the use of open formats and standards." See id.
227. The entire Telecoms Package is based on group of five Directives and one Regulation
concerning a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks: Directive
2009/140/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 Amending
Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
Networks and Services 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37; Directive 2009/136/EC, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 November 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service
and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 O.J. (L
337) 11; Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on
Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer
Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11; Directive 2002/19/EC on Access to, and Interconnection of,
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities; and Directive 2002/20/EC on the
Authorization of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37;
Commission Regulation 1211/2009, Establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic
Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 1.
228. See Directive 2009/140/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2009 Amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Networks and Services 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37, art. 1(3)(a).
229. Press Release, European Commission, European Parliament Approves EU Telecoms
Reform but Adds 1 Amendment: Commission Reaction Memo/09/219 (May 6, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/219 [hereinafter Press
Release 1]; see also Press Release, European Commission, EU Telecoms Reform: 12 Reforms to
Pave Way for Stronger Consumer Rights, an Open Internet, a Single European Telecoms Market




freedom of expression and access to information and education, as well as due
process.
2 3 0
All these legislative attempts to regulate online communication
demonstrate the importance of balancing essential business needs
with the rights of individuals. In addition, the regulation of online
content cannot keep pace with the developments, social relevance, and
the absence of geographical boundaries of the medium. It appears
unsuccessful to try to restrict and block access to technologies or the
flow of online information by domestic legislation.231 In particular, the
HADOPI's graduated response approach shows-again-how the
regulation of content distributed through the Internet must be done
providing the necessary degree of protection required by the rule of
law in every democratic society.
V. THE ONGOING TRANSNATIONAL CONTROVERSY AROUND THE RIGHT
TO INTERNET ACCESS
As previously discussed, there is an ongoing debate among
scholars, policy makers, and civil rights activists around the
recognition of a fundamental right to "Internet access." As already
pointed out, the preliminary question concerns the determination of
the meaning of Internet access. 232 The concept can include different
functional meanings: access to network infrastructure, access at the
transport layer, and access to digital content and applications.
233
Generally speaking, when talking about Internet access, the access to
network infrastructure serves as a useful reference point. It could be
said that this condition essentially includes the other two functional
meanings. 234 Nevertheless, scholarly opinion looks upon the question
230. Press Release 1, supra note 210.
231. See ftric Brousseau, Internet Regulation: Does Self-Regulation Require an
Institutional Framework? (2001), available at http:/Ibrousseau.info/pdf/EBISNIERegIntO8O1.pdf
("Any regulation of the content can be bypassed through the Internet because no governmental
agency would be able to efficiently supervise the exchanges of information among citizens ...
and between them and foreign third parties that are not submitted to the same regulations.").
232. See supra Part I.B.
233. See id.
234. As observed by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and
expression-Mr. Frank La Rue-we can also consider two dimensions of "Internet access": access
to the network infrastructure (connectivity) and access to online content. See Human Rights
Council 2011, supra note 35, 3. Both aspects pose specific, but interrelated fundamental rights
challenges. See id. The first one relates to the availability of information for Internet users. See
id. Restricting access to content is a serious impairment of the freedom of users. Connectivity
relates to the infrastructure necessary to access the content: such as cable, software and devices
etc. See id.
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with more critical eyes. 235 States are already obligated to promote all
the means necessary to exercise the right to freedom of expression and
such means include the Internet; therefore, there is no formal need to
explicitly codify a right to the Internet "as such."
236
A. Myriad Approaches
Internet access issues present globally; in fact many countries
have developed or proposed similar legislation to cover these common
issues. In addition to France, other countries have also taken
important actions concerning the question of access to the Internet.
23 7
Finland, Estonia, Greece, and Costa Rica have undertaken steps in
ensuring that access to broadband Internet is defined as a universal
service, similar to other public utilities like telephone service, water
supply, electricity, and so on.2 38 The acknowledgement of a universal
service principle plays a key role in information policy.239  The
principle's purpose is to guarantee all individuals access to
fundamental services on public networks. 240 In particular, a universal
service is based on the availability of a minimum set of high-quality
services to which all end-users have access, at an affordable price in
the light of specific national conditions, without distorting
235. See, e.g., Best, supra note 59; Land, supra note 135, at 398; Young Joon Lim &
Sarah E. Sexton, Internet as a Human Right: A Practical Legal Framework to Address the
Unique Nature of the Medium and to Promote Development, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 295, 297
(2012) (exploring the treatment of Internet freedom as a human right and considering the nature
and limits to that entitlement); Jonathon Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and
Intellectual Origins, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 10, 12 & n.6 (2011); Phillip F. Weiss, Protecting a
Right to Access Internet Content: The Feasibility of Judicial Enforcement in a Non-neutral
Network, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 383 (2011); Stephen B. Wicker & Stephanie M. Santoso, Access to
the Internet Is a Human Right, 56 COMM. ACM 43, 43-46 (2013); Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Access
Is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A25; Dutton et al., supra note 8; Stephen
Tully, A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects, 14 HuM. RTS. L. REV.
(forthcoming June 2014).
236. See, e.g., Land, supra note 135; Penney, supra note 241; Cerf, supra note 241; see
also Lucchi, supra note 156.
237. See Doris Estelle Long, Three Strikes and You Are off the Internet, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL. (Oct. 29, 2010).
238. See Paul De Hert & Dariusz Kloza, Internet (Access) as a New Fundamental Right.
Inflating the Current Rights Framework? 3 EUR. J. L. & TECH (2012); Mandla Msimang, The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Strategies for Financing Universal
Broadband Access, INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM 81 (2012),
available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/trendsl2.html.
239. See Directive 2002/22/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002 on Universal Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks




competition. 241 In this regard it is important to highlight that the
concept of universal service is not synonymous with the right to
communicate.
In Finland, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has
authority to set the minimum legal rate of a functional Internet
access. 242 The decree establishing that authority does not mention an
explicit individual right to access the network infrastructure but
rather contemplates a civil right to broadband.243 In particular, it
states that access to broadband Internet is a universal service, similar
to other public utilities like telephone service, water supply, and
electricity.244 According to Finnish law, the Internet is considered a
staple commodity to which every consumer and company must have
access. 245 This also means that Finnish telecommunication companies
are required to provide all Finnish citizens with an Internet
connection that runs at a reasonable connection speed.
In Estonia, Section 33 of the Public Information Act stipulates
that "every person shall be afforded the opportunity to have free
access to public information through the Internet in public
libraries."246  Moreover, in Estonian telecommunications legislation,
Internet access is also considered a universal service. 247 In particular,
paragraph five of the Act provides a list of universal services,
including Internet services, and stipulates that they are to be made
available to all subscribers at an identical price, regardless of their
geographical location. 248
Finally, in Greece, the constitutional reforms of 2001 amended
the Hellenic Constitution introducing, among other novelties, an
explicit right for all citizens to participate effectively in society.249
241. See id., at Recital 4; see also Hert & Kioza, supra note 244 ("[A universal service]
can constitutej an enforceable right, but it is not conceived nor recognized as a fundamental or
human right. The right, where it is recognized, figures in secondary legislation.").
242. Decree 732/2009, of the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the
Minimum Rate of a Functional Internet Access as a Universal Service, Oct. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/enlaki/kaannokset2009/en20090732.pdf.
243. See Communications Market Act of 2003 (Fin.), art. 60c(2). The decree amended the
Communications Market Act of 2003 adding a new paragraph 3 to Article 60c providing for a
specific inclusion of a functional Internet connection as part of universal service. See id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Public Information Act, Nov. 15, 2000 (Est.), available at
http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/X40095K4.htm.
247. See Telekommunikatsiooniseadus of February 9, 2000 (RT I 2000, 18, 116), § 5(2),
available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/71844.
248. Id.
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Specifically, the second paragraph of Article 5A stipulates that the
state is obligated to facilitate the access to and the exchange,
production, and dissemination of information. transmitted
electronically.
250
More recently, the Constitutional Court of Costa Rica declared
Internet access to be a fundamental right.251 That court observed that
in the context of the information or knowledge society, public authorities are required-
for the benefit of those governed-to promote and ensure universally the access to these
new technologies. The delay in opening the telecommunications market has an impact
on the exercise and enjoyment of other fundamental rights, such as the consumers' right
to freedom of choice (Article 46, last paragraph of the Constitution), the constitutional
right of access to new information technologies, the right to equality and the elimination
of digital divide (art. 33 of the Constitution), the right of access to the Internet through
the interface that the user or the consumer chooses and the freedom of enterprise and
trade.
2 52
In Italy, there is a provocative proposal that would introduce a
new Article 21bis to the Italian Constitution. 253 In the Italian legal
system, Article 21 of the Constitution stipulates that people have the
right to freely express their thoughts in speech, writing, or any other
form of communication. 25 4 The proposal, officially presented and
proposed by Professor Stefano RodotA and Wired Magazine Italy,
sparked a lively debate in Italy between supporters and opponents.
255
250. Id.
251. See Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, Andres
Oviedo Guzman v. Ministerio de Ambiente, Energia y Telecomunicaciones, Sentencia No. 2010-
012790, 30 July 2010, available at http://200.91.68.20/pj/scij/busqueda/jurisprudencia
/jur-repartidor.asp?param 1=TSS&nValor=1&nValor2=483874&strTipM=T&strDirSel=directo.
252. Id. The original text reads as follows:
En este contexto de la sociedad de la informaci6n o del conocimiento, se impone a los
poderes piblicos, en beneficio de los administrados, promover y garantizar, en forma
universal, el acceso a estas nuevas tecnologias. Partiendo de lo expuesto, concluye este
Tribunal Constitucional que el retardo verificado en la apertura del mercado de las
telecomunicaciones ha quebrantado no solo el derecho consagrado en el articulo 41 de
la Constituci6n Politica sino que, ademdis, ha incidido en el ejercicio y disfrute de otros
derechos fundamentales como la libertad de elecci6n de los consumidores consagrada
en el articulo 46, pirrafo in fine, constitucional, el derecho de acceso a las nuevas
tecnologias de la informaci6n, el derecho a la igualdad y ]a erradicaci6n de la brecha
digital (info-exclusi6n) -articulo 33 constitucional-, el derecho de acceder a la internet
por la interfase que elija el consumidor o usuario y la libertad empresarial y de
comercio.
Id.
253. See Disegno di Legge Costituzionale [Constitutional Bill], 6 Decembre 2010
[December 6, 2010], n.2485, at 4, available at http://www.senato.itdservice/PDF
/PDFServerBGT/00519114.pdf.
254. See Art. 21 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
255. See Stefano RodotA, Un Articolo2l-bis per Internet, ARTICOLO21.INFO, available at
http://archivi.articolo21.org/2183/notizia/un-articolo2lbis-per-internet-.html; see also Luca
Annunziata, Internet e Costituzione, niente bis, PUNTO-NFORMATICO.IT, available at http://punto-
informatico.it304835 l/Pl/Commenti/internet-costituzione-niente-bis.aspx; Giovanni Maria
Riccio, Art. 21-bis? Siamo proprio sicuri?, COPYRIGHT & INTERNET, available at
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In December 2010, a group of Italian Parliament members submitted
a constitutional amendment to introduce this new provision in the
Italian constitution. 56 However, the prevailing opinion is that in this
context, there is no need for constitutional amendments designed
specifically to protect the right of access to the Internet. 257 Such a
principle, it is argued, can be easily derived from existing standards
on freedom of speech or expression through an interpretation of the
same principle in a contemporary way.258 The practical example is the
interpretive approach adopted by the French Constitutional Council in
the evaluation of the HADOPI law.
259
B. An Indispensable Tool for Realizing a Range of Human Rights
The question of Internet access was also the subject of a recent
United Nations Human Rights Council report prepared by the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression.2 60 This document closely
examined the practical and legal aspects directly related to the access
to the Internet infrastructure. 26 1 In particular, the report investigates
key trends and challenges to the right of all individuals to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds through the
Internet. 262 The primary focus of the report is to address the issue of
universal access to the Internet. 263 In this context, it describes access
to the Internet as the most powerful instrument for increasing access
to information and facilitating active citizen participation in building
http://gmriccio.wordpress.com/2010/12/O1/art-21-bis/; Guido Scorza, Internet come diritto
Costituzionale, available at http://www.guidoscorza.itl?p=2310; Fulvio Sarzana, Rodota Wired e
la Grundnorm ovvero l'art 21 bis della Costituzione Il diritto di accesso ad internet, DIRITTO.NET,
available at http://www.diritto.net/blog-fulog-avv-fulvio-sarzana/7186-rodota-wired-e-la-
grundnorm-ovvero-lart-2 1-bis-della-costituzione-il-diritto-di-accesso-ad-internet-come-norma-
fondante-senza-alcuna-sanzione-per-le-violazioni.html (opposing the proposal).
256. See Disegno di Legge Costituzionale [Constitutional Bill], 6 Decembre 2010
[December 6, 2010], n.2485, at 1, available at http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/
PDFServer/BGT/00519114.pdf.
257. See Sarzana, supra note 261. On this debate, see also Marco Orofino,
L'Inquadramento Costituzionale del Web 2.0 : Da Nuovo Mezzo per la Liberta di Espressione a
Presupposto per L'esercizio di una Pluralita di Diritti Costituzionali in DA INTERNET Al SOCIAL
NETWORK: IL DIRITTO DI RICEVERE E COMUNICARE INFORMAZIONI E IDEE 33, 50 (Ruggiero Cafari
Panico et al. eds., 2013).
258. See, e.g., Land, supra note 135.
259. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-58ODC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bankmmlanglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
260. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35.
261. See id. ch. V.
262. See id. 1.
263. See id. ch. V.
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democratic societies.264 As such, Internet access should not to be
subjected to any arbitrary restrictions. 265 Based on this assessment,
the report declares that states should not institute any laws that
prevent citizens from accessing the Internet.266 It also underlines the
fundamental nature of the Internet as a powerful communication
medium given that "the Internet has become a key means by which
individuals can exercise their right to freedom and expression.
'" 267
Additionally, the document states that:
Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human
rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human progress,
ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States. Each State
should thus develop a concrete and effective policy, in consultation with individuals from
all sections of society, including the private sector and relevant Government ministries,
to make the Internet widely available, accessible and affordable to all segments of
population.
26 8
Contrary to some simplistic media reports,269 the document
does not claim that Internet access is--or could be-considered to be a
human right.270 Many have erroneously interpreted this report to
mean that Internet access is inherently a new human right.271 What
the report does say is that the Internet, "by acting as a catalyst for
individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and
expression," can facilitate "the realization of a range of other human
rights."272 The report merely indicates that the Internet is a facilitator
264. See id. 7 54 & 55.
265. See id. 57.
266. See id. In addition, the Special Rapporteur underlines that "censorship measures
should never be delegated to a private entity . . . and that intermediaries should not be held
liable for refusing to take action that infringes individuals' human rights." Id. 7 43 & 75.
267. See id. 20.
268. See id. 85.
269. See, e.g., Editorial, Free Speech and the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, at A18,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/opinion/04mon3.html; Dave Lee, Should
Internet Users Ever Be Cut Off?, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2011),
http://news.bbc.co.uk2/hi/programmes/click-online/9509215.stm; Nathan Olivarez-Giles, United
Nations Report: Internet Access Is a Human Right, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 3, 2011),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/06/united-nations-report-internet-access-is-a-
human-right.html; Nidhi Subbaraman, UN Report: Internet Access Is a Basic Human Right, NBC
NEWS (June 3, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/un-report-internet-access-basic-
human-right-122942; Jenny Wilson, United Nations Report Declares Internet Access a Human
Right, TIME (June 7, 2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/06/07/united-nations-report-declares-
internet-access-a-human-right; Internet Access Is a Human Right, United Nations Report
Declares, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/internet-
access-human-right-united-nations-report n_872836.html.
270. See Land, supra note 135, at 400 (arguing that in the UN Report there is no right to
the Internet "as such," even if a close examination of Article 19(2) and its drafting history reveals
that it does protect rights in and to technology).
271. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
272. UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, 22.
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for the enjoyment of human rights and can also provide invaluable
support in ensuring enjoyment of these rights at a much higher
level. 27 3 As a consequence, this particular factor offers many more
opportunities for the full exercise of rights to those who have access to
the network compared to those who have limited or no access. In this
perspective, it would be extremely helpful to democratize access to the
Internet in view of its positive effect on the full enjoyment of a wide
range of individual rights.
In the light of this observation, the Rapporteur provides
suggestions to promote and facilitate the enjoyment of the right to
freedom of expression using the Internet: Given that access to basic
commodities such as electricity remains difficult in many developing
States, the Special Rapporteur is acutely aware that universal access
to the Internet for all individuals worldwide cannot be achieved
instantly. However, the Special Rapporteur reminds all States of their
positive obligation to promote or to facilitate the enjoyment of the
right to freedom of expression and the means necessary to exercise
this right, including the Internet. Hence, States should adopt effective
and concrete policies and strategies-developed in consultation with
individuals from all segments of society, including the private sector
as well as relevant government ministries-to make the Internet
widely available, accessible and affordable to all.274
Therefore, the scope of the report is limited to highlighting a
set of important principles central to the issue of freedom of
communication in the digital environment, with a focus on the
substantial and transformative potential of the Internet.
More recently-on the basis of the outcome of the La Rue
report-the United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously
adopted a resolution proposed by Sweden that affirmed the need to
protect and secure human rights on the Internet.275 Specifically, the
resolution states the principle that "the same rights that people have
offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of
expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any
media of one's choice, in accordance with Article 19 of both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."276  In addition to this
fundamental principle, the resolution encourages all states to promote
273. See id.
274. Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, 66.
275. See Human Rights Council Res. 20/L.13, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment
of Human Rights on the Internet, 20th Sess., June 29, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (June 29,
2012), available at http://ap.ohchr.orgdocuments/E/HRC/d-res_dec/AHRC-20-L13.doc.
276. See id.
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and facilitate "access to the Internet and international cooperation
aimed at the development of media and information and
communications facilities in all countries."27 7  Support for the
resolution was unexpectedly broad. 278 It was approved by 47 members
of the council including-with some reservations-China and Cuba.
279
The overall impression gained from all these discussions
indicates a rather tremendous amount of misunderstanding
concerning the substantial difference between civil rights and
fundamental rights (or human rights).280 The question concerns the
legal nature of these information rights. The confusing and
misleading discourses about "a right to Internet access" have led to a
simplistic categorization of the Internet as a fundamental right. 28 1 In
reality, as the analysis of the United Nations Report demonstrates,
the intersection of fundamental rights with the Internet is much more
complex and multifaceted than the simple wording suggests. In the
contemporary media scenario, access to the Internet is a necessary
condition for concrete achievement of some fundamental human rights
such as freedom of speech, communication, and expression of
thought. 28 2 These observations may lead to interpretations of recent
court decisions and regulatory interventions not as recognition of a
new fundamental right but rather as an opportunity to give an
updated meaning to already-recognized fundamental legal rights.
28 3
To a certain extent, defining violations does not imply an automatic
creation of new rights but is actually a remedial exercise or a
redefinition of existing rights. All these considerations address the
fact that Internet access is eventually an enabler of rights.28 4 The
277. See id.
278. See Stephanie Nebehay, UN Forum Backs Web Freedom After Arab Spring,
REUTERS (July 5, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2012/07/05/net-us-rights-
internet-idUSBRE8640DE20120705.
279. See id.
280. See Hert & Kloza, supra note 244 ("Civil rights are different from human rights
because they are conferred upon us by law, not intrinsic to us as human beings.").
281. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
282. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC,
June 10, 2009, Rec. 107 (Fr.) 12, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnellroot/bank-mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
283. See Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, Andres
Oviedo Guzman v. Ministerio de Ambiente, Energia y Telecomunicaciones, Sentencia No. 2010-
012790, 30 July 2010, available at http://200.91.68.20/pj/scij/busqueda/jurisprudencia
/jur-repartidor.asp?param1=TSS&nValor1=1&nValor2=483874&strTipM=T&strDirSel=directo;
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 2009,
Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnell
root/bank_mmlanglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English).
284. See UN Human Rights Council 2011, supra note 35, 22.
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Internet could be also considered as an instrument to enjoy rights and
freedoms already granted, rather than a specific right itself.
28 5
CONCLUSION
This Article has described Internet access as a necessary
condition for active participation in society. In particular, the advent
of the Internet has begged the important question of how to interpret
the right to participate in the virtual society.28 6 In other words, how to
assess, from a legal perspective, the optimal setting of the freedom to
use digital communication tools both to provide information and
obtain information. It is no longer just a mere exercise of the
traditional right to freedom of thought and expression. It is
increasingly perceived as a constitutional dilemma, and courts are
increasingly asked to resolve this dispute concerning the evolutionary
interpretation of law.2 7 Communication technologies have a great
impact-both positive and negative-on many aspects of human
rights. In particular, communication technologies have the potential
to bring about transformations to the social, technological, and legal
conditions in which current human-rights principles were originally
settled. Communication technologies are also increasingly becoming a
fundamental part of the democratic process, offering a large range of
possibilities in exercising human rights. For all these reasons, a
limited or fully restricted access to these technologies can deprive
individuals of the capacity to completely exercise their fundamental
rights and freedoms. In this scenario, this Article has drawn attention
to various perspectives, including the argument that states should
285. See Cerf, supra note 241.
286. See Vittorio Frosini, L'orizzonte Giuridico dell'Internet, in IL DIRITTO
DELL'INFORMAZIONE E DELL'INFORMATICA 271, 275 (2002).
287. See Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, Andres
Oviedo Guzman v. Ministerio de Ambiente, Energia y Telecomunicaciones, Sentencia No. 2010-
012790, 30 July 2010, available at http://200.91.68.20/pj/scijlbusqueda/jurisprudencia/
jur repartidor.asp?paraml=TSS&nValorl=1&nValor2=483874&strTipM=T&strDirSel=directo;
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580DC, June 10, 2009,
Rec. 107 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
root/bank-mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf (in English); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 24, 2013, No. III ZR 98/12, 2013 (Ger.)
(ruling that access to the Internet represents a basic need in the modern society). For more
details, see Mitteilung der Pressestelle [Press Release], Bundesgerichtshof erkennt
Schadensersatz fir den Ausfall eines Internetanschlusses zu (Jan. 24, 2013), available at
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm
&pmnummer=0014/13. As an example, see also the pending case Jankovskis v. Lithuania,
Application No 21575/08, before the European Court of Human Rights (involving a Lithuanian
prisoner who was denied the access to Internet in order to enroll at the University). For a brief
overview of the case, see Paul De Hert, P., Dariusz Kloza, Internet (access) as a new fundamental
right. Inflating the current rights framework? EUR. J. L. & TECH. Vol. 3. No. 3, 2012.
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support and increase legal and practical measures to prevent
governmental and private forms of suspension, restriction, or denial of
access to the Internet.
This context has been employed to read some recent
controversies over Internet regulation, including the French
controversy over the constitutionality of the HADOPI law, the
controversy over the constitutionality of the US Communication
Decency Act of 1996, and some other internationally debated cases
over Internet-related policies. Using these cases as a paradigmatic
example, this Article reflected on the importance of fundamental
rights as an institutional safeguard against the expansionary
tendency of market powers and on the increasing role of the courts in
expanding and adapting the frontiers of fundamental legal rights.
This Article also observed how the Internet has effectively
returned more power to individuals with a radical redistribution of
control on information flow and a completely new approach to the way
in which society operates. For the first time, the constitutional
principle of freedom of expression has been formally expanded to
include Internet access as part of freedom of speech. The rationale for
this expansion is based on the idea that the right of each individual to
access digital network services is an essential ingredient in the
freedom of communication and expression. In particular, the inability
to access to Internet networks negatively affects other rights.
While some judicial opinions recognize a freedom to connect to
the Internet, this does not imply that Internet access is a fundamental
right. Rather, it is the general constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression that includes a guarantee of Internet access. Uninhibited
access to Internet network infrastructure is a prerequisite to the
effective exercise of freedom of expression and access to information.
As a consequence, limitations on the right to Internet access can only
be imposed under strict conditions, just as with limitations imposed on
other forms of expression and communication. The development of
global communication systems has therefore offered an unexpected
opportunity to advance information and communication rights.
Communication rights-thanks to both judicial and legislative
interpretation-are gradually improving; moving from a
fundamentally "one-way freedom of speech" to a more inclusive and
interactive right to communicate.
288
288. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 36 (2008) ("A system of
freedom of expression encompasses, in addition to the negative liberty right of free speech, an




The problem up until now has been that the Internet has
grown into a mature medium with little government regulation. 28 9
But an increasing change of perspective is evident in the policy debate
where the question of Internet regulation is currently an emerging
and controversial argument. This change of course is based on the
understanding that traditional media is converging around the
Internet, and it is now becoming both a telecommunications medium
and a mass medium. 290 For this reason, political and economic
pressures to extend some forms of regulation to the Internet are
growing.
Regulating the Internet, however, would mean regulating all
media-restricting the flow of information as well as its exchange.
This is why the issue of Internet regulation has found itself at the
center of a geopolitical clash played at an international level and
involving multiple actors and interests. All the leading great powers
(including the United States, Russia, Continental Europe, China and
Japan), as well as countries with lower levels of democracy or
authoritarian regimes, seem determined to retain control of this new
communication dimension.291 It is precisely because of this lack of
agreement that discussions concerning the legal regime of the Internet
are destined to remain a challenging and controversial issue on the
agenda of national and international policy-making bodies.
In this complex and variable situation-directly affected by the
ongoing technological evolution-it is not easy to differentiate between
new rights, updates to traditional rights, and the concept of emerging
human rights. The problem with this kind of investigation is that
289. See ROBINSON & NACHBAR, supra note 235, at 31.
290. See id. at 32.
291. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER (2011). A clear testimony
of these diverging views on Internet governance was the world conference on international
telecommunications held in Dubai in December 2012, with the intent to renegotiate the treaty of
1998 that gave birth to the International Telecommunications Regulations (JTRs). Currently,
these regulations do not specifically concern technical standards, infrastructure, or content, but
some states are supporting an expansion of the criteria to include some form of legislative
provisions on Internet regulation with the potential to have direct adverse effects on
fundamental rights and freedoms. At the conference, most Western democracies refused to sign a
new treaty that would grant a UN agency more control over how the Internet works. See Final
Acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference Melbourne, 1988 (Wattc-
99): International Telecommunication Regulations, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION 3-8 (1989), available
at http://www.itu.intdms-pub/itu-s/oth/O2/01/S02010000214002PDFE.pdf. For a further
discussion on this point, see David A. Gross & Ethan Lucarelli, The 2012 World Conference on
International Telecommunications: Another Brewing Storm Over Potential UN Regulation of the
Internet, WHO'SWHOLEGAL (Nov. 2011), http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/
29378/the-2012-world-conference-internationaltelecommunications-brewing-storm-potential-un-
regulation-internet. See also CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ITU Move to Expand Powers
Threatens the Internet: Civil Society Should Have Voice in ITU Internet Debate (Mar. 12, 2012),
available at https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-ITUWCIT12_background.pdf.
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"rights have their place, but their place is limited," and they cannot be
used as "a moral panacea" to all contemporary problems.
292
This seemingly obvious consideration can suggest a
fundamentally different understanding in the definition and
protection of new rights. All legal rights have costs, both economic
and noneconomic. 293  Consequently, one of the key questions in
deciding what rights individuals should have is considering whether
they are worth those costs. In such circumstances, the claim of a new
right requires a determination whether a limitation of other
conflicting rights or interests is a reasonable and justifiable approach.
As a result of these considerations, the protection of new and
enhanced means of expressing and communicating information may
be seen under a different perspective. It ig not necessary to rigidly
define new rights or expand old ones, but rather to ensure new
freedoms against new forms of control and restriction identifying and
removing major obstacles that prevent this objective being met. This
assessment takes into account the existence or absence of specific
limits incompatible with the complete unfolding of individual
freedoms. The recognition of new rights is a zero-sum game, because
every progress in the acknowledgment of a new right often implies a
step back of another right.
294
292. See ELIZABETH HANKINS WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 49 (1987).
293. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 151 (1999) (noting that all rights have costs that require some form of
government action).
294. See generally ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers
trans., 2002).
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